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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
MERCEDES TURNER, 
Plaintiff; 
vs. 
CITY OF LAPWAI, an Idaho municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. C V 1 2 • Q 2 5 8 7 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL 
COMES NOW Plaintiff Mercedes Turner, by and through her counsel of record, John M. 
Howell of the firm Brassey, Crawford & Howell, PLLC, and claims and alleges against Defendant 
as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff Mercedes Turner is a resident of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
2. Defendant City of Lapwai is a municipal corporation located in Nez Perce County, 
Idaho. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMt\ND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1 
JURISDICTION AND VENlJE 
3. Jurisdiction is proper in this district because the Court has subject matter jurisdiction 
over this action pursuantto Idaho Code § § 1-705, 6-914, and 45-615, and personal jurisdiction over 
the Defendant pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-914. 
4. Venue is proper within this district pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-915 because 
Defendant is a political subdivision of the State ofldaho that is located in Nez Perce County. The 
amount in controversy in this lawsuit, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds the jurisdictional 
minimum of this Court. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
5. In May of2006, Plaintiff Mercedes Turner was hired by Defendant City of Lapwai 
(hereinafter, the "City''). 
6. Mrs~ TµID~(s_ duties for the_ City were numerous and varied in both scope and 
demand. Mrs. Turner's primary function was serving as the City's clerk and treasurer, but Mrs. 
Turner was also compensated for duties performed for the City's water, sewer, and street 
departments. 
7. Mrs. Turner agreed with the City Council and the City's then-Mayor, David Fazzio, 
regarding the terms of her employment. Mrs. Turner was paid an annual salary on the basis of a 35-
hour work week, with Fridays off. 
8. In addition to her annual salary, Mayor Fazzio and the City Council agreed that Mrs. 
Turner would accrue "comp time" at a one-to-one ratio for every hour that she worked during a week 
in excess of her required 35 hours. This "comp time" would be payable at the rate of 1.5 times her 
hourly salary upon Mrs. Turner's termination or departure from employment with the City. The City 
COMPLAINT ANTI DEMAND FOR JURY TRlAL - 2 5 
was suffering a budgetary crisis, and Mr. Fazzio and Mrs. Turner agreed that comp time, in lieu of 
overtime pay, would benefit the City fiscally. 
9. Mayor Fazzio and the City Council further agreed that Mrs. Turner would receive five 
weeks of vacation time annually. 
10. Mrs. Turner's compensation package, including comp time, vacation accrual, and 
Fridays off, was memorialized and signed by Mayor Fazzio on the City's Fiscal Year 2008 budget. 
The City's budget was prepared and approved by both Mayor Fazzio and the City Council. 
11. Mrs. Turner was never given a personnel policy by the City at any time during her 
employment therewith. Mrs. Turner did not sign a personnel policy or a personnel policy attestation 
form at any time during her employment with the City. 
12. Mrs. Turner was a diligent worker during the course and scope of her employment 
with the City, often working long hours, nights, and weekends due to the demands placed on her by 
virtue of the understaffed and disorganized state of the municipal government of the City. 
13. The City had no methodology by which the petty expenses attendant to the operation 
thereof were to be paid by its employees. Mrs. Turner paid for such petty expenses with her personal 
money, and distributed her personal money to other City employees for petty expenses. Mrs. Turner 
often had to drive to Lewiston in order to make purchases, at her own expense, necessary for the 
basic functioning of the City. 
14. Mrs. Turner's employment with the City ended in January 2011. 
15. At the time Mrs. Turner ceased working for the City, Mrs. Turner was owed 
compensation for, inter alia, 84 hours of wages, 611 hours of vacation, and 898.25 hours of comp 
time. 
CO:rvIPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 3 
16. :M:rs. Turner presented numerous notices of a claim for the remainder of her due and 
owing wages to the City immediately upon the cessation of her employment. The City paid :M:rs. 
Turner for the 84 hours of wages due and owing, but has failed to pay :M:rs. Turner the remainder of 
her due and owing wages. 
FlRsT CAUSE OF ACTION - WAGE CLAIM 
17. Plaintiff repeats herein by this reference each and every allegation set forth in 
Paragraphs 1 through 16, inclusive, as if said paragraphs were set forth herein in full. 
18. The City has failed to pay Mrs. Turner the full wages owed her upon cessation of her 
employment, in violation of Idaho Code § 45-606. 
19. Specifically, the City has failed to pay :M:rs. Turner ( 1) all accrued comp time; (2) all 
accrued vacation time; and (3) all accrued sick leave. 
20. As a direct and proximate result of the City's failure and refusal to pay Mrs. Turner 
( 1) all accrued comp time; (2) all accrued vacation time; and (3) all accrued sick leave, she has been 
damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION - FAIL URE TO REIMBURSE EXPENSES 
21. Plaintiff repeats herein by this reference each and every allegation set forth in 
Paragraphs 1 through 21, inclusive, as if said paragraphs were set forth herein in full. 
22. The City has failed to reimburse :M:rs. Turner for expenses she personally incurred on 
behalf of the City while employed thereby. 
23. Specifically, the City has failed to reimburse Mrs. Turner for (1) all travel expenses; 
and (2) City expenses paid for personally by Mrs. Turner. 
COM.PLAINT AND DEMM1D FOR JURY TRIAL - 4 1 
24. As a direct and proximate result of the City's failure and refusal to reimburse Mrs. 
Turner for (1) all travel expenses; and (2) City expenses paid for personally by Mrs. Turner, she has 
been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
Plaintiff has been required to retain the law firm of Brassey, Crawford & Howell, PLLC, to 
represent her in this matter and is entitled to recover her attorney's fees and costs for said 
representation pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 45-615(2), 12-120, 12-121, and Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d). 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows: 
As to the First cause of action, the entry of judgment in favor of Plaintiff against Defendant 
City of Lapwai as follows: 
A. For judgment against Defendant for damages in an amount to be proven at trial. Such 
judgment is properly trebled pursuant to Idaho Code§ 45-615(2); 
B. For reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 45-615(2), 
12-120, 12-121, and Idaho R. Ci v. P. 54( d). In the event this matter is uncontested and Defendant 
allows the entry of default judgment against it, Plaintiff prays for reasonable attorney's fees in the 
amount of $5,000.00. 
C. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury, composed of no less than twelve (12) persons, on all issues, 
claims, and defenses so triable, pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the United States of America 
and the State of Idaho. 
CO.MPL.AThi"'T AND DEJ\1AND FOR JURY TRIAL - 5 
DATED this 19th day of December, 2012. 
BRAS SEY, CRAWFORD & HOWELL, PLLC 
. o 1, Of the Finn 
eys for Plaintiff 
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ISB No. 3737 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Lapwai 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
MERCEDES TURNER, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
CITY OF LAPWAI, an Idaho municipal ) 
corporation, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. CV 12-02587 
ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL 
Fee Category: I. I. 
Fee: $66.00 
Defendant, City of Lapwai, by and through its attorney, Bentley G. 
Stromberg of Clements, BroY\'Il & McNichols, P.A., answers Plaintiffs Complaint as 
follows: 
ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL -1- 10 
1. Defendant admits paragraph 1. 
2. Defendant admits paragraph 2. 
3. Answering paragraph 3, defendant admits that this court has both personal 
and subject matter jurisdiction, but defendant denies that such jurisdiction is based on all 
of the cited statutes. 
4. Answering paragraph 4, defendant admits that venue 1s proper in this 
district but denies that it is proper for each of the alleged reasons. 
5. Defendant admits paragraph 5. 
6. Answering paragraph 6, Defendant admits that Plaintiff had numerous 
duties and that her primary function was serving as the City's Clerk and Treasurer, but 
denies the remaining allegations of the paragraph due to their ambiguity. 
7. Defendant denies paragraph 7. 
8. Defendant denies paragraph 8. 
9. Defendant denies paragraph 9. 
10. Defendant denies paragraph 10. 
11. Defendant denies paragraph 11. 
12. Defendant denies paragraph 12. 
13. Defendant denies paragraph 13. 
14. Defendant admits paragraph 14. 
ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR 
JURYTRlAL -2- I l 
15. Defendant denies paragraph 15. 
16. Defendant denies paragraph 16. 
17. Answering paragraph 1 7, Defendant incorporates and re-alleges its 
responses to the referenced paragraphs. 
18. Defendant denies paragraph 18. 
19. Defendant denies paragraph 19. 
20. Defendant denies paragraph 20. 
21. Answering paragraph 21, Defendant incorporates and re-alleges its 
responses to the referenced paragraphs. 
22. Defendant denies paragraph 22. 
23. Defendant denies paragraph 23. 
24. Defendant denies paragraph 24. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
I. 
Plaintiffs first cause of action is barred by the six-month statute of limitations 
made applicable by Idaho Code § 45-614. 
ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL -3- I~ 
II. 
Plaintiffs first cause of action is barred for her failure timely to file a claim with 
the clerk of the City of Lapwai meeting the requirements of Idaho Code§§ 50-219 and 6-
906. 
III. 
Plaintiffs second cause of action is barred for her failure timely to file a claim 
with the clerk of the City of Lapwai meeting the requirements of Idaho Code §§ 50-219 
and 6-906. 
IV. 
Further investigation and discovery may reveal that Plaintiffs first and second 
causes of action are barred pursuant to the doctrines of waiver and estoppel and other 
equitable defenses. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Demand is hereby made for a trial of all issues which may appropriately be 
tried to a jury. Defendant will not stipulate to a jury less than twelve (12) persons. 
DATED this 15th day of February, 2013. 
CLEMEN/TS ,BR~.. / & McNICHOLS, P.A. /! . f~/;,?n·f!t;1' /J 
, l,/! )· , / /I/I 
ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL 
l II '?111; '/;· -By .1 f / u r 
/j ENTtEY G. STROMB 
~1 Attorneys for Defendant 
-4- \3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of February, 2013, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
John M. Howell 
Matthew G. Gunn 
Brassey, Crawford & Howell, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1009 
Boise, ID 83701-1009 
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321 13th Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
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ISB No. 3737 
ISB No. 9180 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Lapwai 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
MERCEDES TURNER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF LAPWAI, an Idaho municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-2587 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUl\lMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant City of Lapwai ("City"), pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(b), moves for 
summary judgment as to plaintiffs claims against it. This Motion is supported by the 
pleadings and documents on file, and by Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment, the Affidavit of William Big Man, and the Affidavit of Counsel 
filed herewith. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DEFE1\TDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IS 
-1-
DATED this 2nd day of July, 2013. 
CHOLS,P.A. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of July, 2013, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
John M. Howell 
Matthew G. Gunn 
Brassey, Crawford & Howell, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1009 
Boise, ID 83701-1009 
DEFE1'<1DANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY WDGMENT 
Bentley G. Stromberg 
Joshua D. Mc Karcher 
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321 13th Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
MERCEDES TURNER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF LAPWAI, an Idaho municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Case No. CV-2012-2587 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, Mercedes Turner ("Turner"), filed this lawsuit against her former 
employer, the City of Lapwai ("City"), without having first filed the statutorily-required 
notice of claim within six months of the accrual of either of her claims. In addition, the 
statute of limitations for Turner's wage claim is six months. Because Turner's 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT -1-
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employment was terminated on January 20, 2011, the relevant deadlines passed over a 
year before Turner filed this lawsuit. Turner's claims should therefore be dismissed. 
II. RELEVANT FACTS 
Turner was hired by the City in May 2006 as City Clerk and City Treasurer. 
(Compl. 'il'il 5-6.) Turner's employment with the City was terminated on January 20, 
2011. (Compl. 'il 14; Big Man Aff. 'il 4.) On February 3, 2011, the City paid Turner her 
last paycheck. (Aff. of Counsel Ex. A.) This paycheck included at least "the 84 hours of 
wages due and owing" to which the City then believed Turner was entitled. (See id.; 
Compl. 'il 16.) Throughout her employment, Turner received paychecks paying her 
wages for each pay period during the term of her employment. (See Big Man Aff. 'il 6 & 
Ex. A.) Each such paycheck contained a paystub similar to the one attached to Turner's 
February 3, 2011 paycheck, noting the periodic accrual, use, and balance of Turner's 
vacation pay, sick pay, and compensatory (or "comp") time. (See, e.g., Aff. of Counsel 
Exs. A, B.)1 
The City clerk never received, and has no record of receiving, notices of claims for 
wages or expense reimbursements meeting the requirements of Idaho Code§§ 50-219, 6-
906, and 6-907. (Big Man Aff. 'il 5.) Turner filed her Complaint in this Court on 
December 21, 2012, which was 23 months after her last day of employment with the 
City. 
1 Plaintiff was not contractually entitled to comp time, but that fact is irrelevant for 
purposes of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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III. ARGUMENT 
Turner claims unpaid wages and unreimbursed expenses. Both claims must be 
dismissed for her failure to file a statutorily-required notice of claim for damages with the 
City clerk. In addition, Turner's wage claim is barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations. 
A. FAILURE TO FILE NOTICE OF CLAIM 
Any person with a claim for damages of any kind against a city must file a notice 
of claim for damages meeting certain statutory specifications. See Idaho Code §§ 50-219 
("All claims for damages against a city must be filed as prescribed by chapter 9, title 6, 
Idaho Code."), 6-906 (providing 180-day limit), 6-907 (requiring claim state certain 
information); Brown v. City of Caldwell, 769 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1258-59, 1263 (D. Idaho 
2011 ). This notice requirement applies to "all damage claims, tort or otherwise." Scott 
Beckstead Real Estate Co. v. City of Preston, 216 P.3d 141, 144 (Idaho 2009) ("All 
claims for damages" means just that; all claims for damages, regardless of the theory 
upon which the claim is based."). Informal notice and even "demand letters" are 
insufficient: the "notice must be (1) in writing; (2) filed with the city clerk; (3) submitted 
within 180 days from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered; 
and (4) contain statutorily-specified information regarding the plaintiffs residence and 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the plaintiffs injuries." Brown, 769 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1263. 
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Satisfying the notice requirement is a "mandatory condition precedent" to bringing 
suit. Banks v. Univ. of Idaho, 798 P.2d 452, 453 (Idaho 1990). If a party cannot provide 
proof that she filed such a timely and sufficient notice of claim, her claim is subject to 
dismissal, including on a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Brown, 769 F. Supp. 
2d at 1262. 
Turner claims damages for unpaid wages and for reimbursement of expenses. 
Turner failed to file a notice of claim meeting the above requirements. (Big Man Aff. 
~ 5.) Both of her claims are thus barred and must be dismissed with prejudice as a matter 
of law. 
B. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Wage claims in Idaho are subject either to a two-year or six-month limitations 
period: 
Any person shall have the right to collect wages, penalties and liquidated 
damages provided by any law or pursuant to a contract of employment, but 
any action thereon shall be filed either with the department or commenced 
in a court of competent jurisdiction within two (2) years after the cause of 
action accrued, provided, however, that in the event salary or wages have 
been paid to any employee and such employee claims additional salary, 
wages, penalties or liquidated damages, because of work done or services 
performed during his employment for the pay period covered by said 
payment, any action therefor shall be commenced within six ( 6) months 
from the accrual of the cause of action. . . . In the event an action is not 
commenced as herein provided, any remedy on the cause of action shall be 
forever barred. 
Idaho Code§ 45-614. 
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The two-year limitations period applies to claims for amounts that do not relate to 
particular pay periods, such as severance pay, annual bonuses, or payments "on account." 
See, e.g., Johnson v. Allied Stores Corp., 679 P.2d 640, 644 (Idaho 1984) (severance 
pay); in Thomas v. Ballou-Latimer Drug Co., 442 P.2d 747, 752 (Idaho 1968) (bonus); 
Anderson v. Lee, 386 P.2d 54, 56 (Idaho 1963) (payments "on account" not attributable to 
particular pay periods). A six-month limitations period applies where, as here, an 
employee claims additional amounts for wages for pay periods for which she has already 
received some payment. See, e.g., Wood v. Kinetic Sys., Inc., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 
1085-86 (D. Idaho 2011) (overtime and "accrued vacation pay" not paid at termination); 
Long v. Idaho Rural Water Ass 'n, No. CV-05-303-S-EJL, 2007 WL 1366534, at *8 (D. 
Idaho Mar. 29, 2007) (training fees for trainings provided on specific dates); Smith v. 
Micron Elecs., Inc., No. CV-01-244-S-BLW, 2005 WL 5328543, at* 6 (D. Idaho Feb. 4, 
2005) (unpaid overtime); Callenders, Inc. v. Beckman, 814 P.2d 429, 434 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1991) (additional partnership salary). 
Wood is directly on point with this case. The employer in Wood paid the plaintiff 
amounts it believed he was owed upon his termination. Wood, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1083. 
The employee in Wood believed he was owed additional amounts for "accrued" and 
"unpaid" vacation pay and overtime. Id. He was terminated on January 20, 2009; paid 
his final paycheck on January 22, 2009; and filed a lawsuit nearly 10 months later on 
October 8, 2009. Id. The Court granted the employer summary judgment, id. at 1087, 
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because the plaintiffs claim were for "additional" wages for pay periods for which he 
had already received payment, id. at 1085-86. 
This case is materially identical. Turner admits that the City paid her for all the 
"wages due and owing" the City believed were owed through the end of Turner's 
employment. (Compl. ~ 16.) Her claim is for "accrued" and unpaid "comp time," 
vacation, and sick leave. (See Compl. ~~ 19-20.) She admits that these amounts are 
additional to wages she was already paid, i.e., "the remainder of her due and owing 
wages." (Compl. ~ 16 (emphasis added).) In both Wood and Callenders, the Court noted 
that the plaintiff had pled "additional" wages. See Wood, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1085; 
Callenders, 814 P.2d at 434. Indeed, Turner has pled "remaining" wages, which is just a 
synonym for "additional" wages. 
The City paid Turner her salary and wages for each pay period throughout her 
employment. (See Big Man Aff. ~ 6 & Ex. A.) Turner's paystubs reflected the periodic 
accrual, use, and balance of the alleged wages she now seeks. (See, e.g., Aff. of Counsel 
Exs. A, B.) All of these accrued in and are attributable to particular pay periods for 
which Turner was already paid her regular wages. Therefore, Turner had only six months 
to file this lawsuit. 
Turner's cause of action accrued no later than January 20, 2011, her last day of 
employment with the City. See Wood, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1085-86. The statute of 
limitations expired no later than July 20, 2011. She filed the present action on December 
21, 2012. The suit is untimely and thus should be dismissed as a matter oflaw. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant should be granted summary judgment on 
all of plaintiffs claims against it. 
DATED this 2nd day of July, 2013. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
MERCEDES TURN"'ER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF LAPWAI, an Idaho municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
State of Idaho ) 
: SS. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
Case No. CV-2012-2587 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
\VILLIAM D. BIG MAN 
WILLIAM D. BIG MAN, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an adult citizen of the United States, competent to testify as a witness 
and make this affidavit on personal knowledge. 
2. I am now, and have been since approximately December 7, 2010, employed 
by the City of Lapwai ("City"). 
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3. I am presently the City Clerk. I was formally appointed the City Clerk on 
April 4, 2011. I performed the duties of the City Clerk from January 20, 2011 until my 
formal appointment as City Clerk. 
4. Mercedes Turner's employment with the City was terminated on January 
20, 2011. 
5. I have made a diligent search of City records. The City has no record of 
Turner filing with the City Clerk's office a written notice of claim containing the 
information required by Idaho Code §§ 50-219 and 6-907 in respect of either Turner's 
wage claim or her expense reimbursement claim. I have never seen or received such a 
notice of claim. To my knowledge, the City Clerk's office never received such a notice 
of claim. 
6. Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Turner's payroll report for the period 
of her employment with the City, which se~s forth the regularly conducted and regularly 
recorded payroll activities of the City and which was produced on pages Bates stamped 
G.003 through G.016 by the defendant during discovery in this matter. 
DATED this 19th day of June, 2013. 
/'. .., ~ _.....--:::: ~~--~~~ ~··WILLIAM D. BIG MAN ----_...__ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of July 2013, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
John M. Howell 
Matthew G. Gunn 
Brassey, Crawford & Howell, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1009 
Boise, ID 83701-1009 
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Exhibit A 
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City of Lapwai Payroll Summary by Name Page. 
Check Issue Date(s): 0510112006 to C212812011 Apr 15, 2013 11:40am 
Report Cnteria: 
Employee Emp No = 114 
Gross I Expense Taxes Decluc1ions Net/ Info 
Date Cneck No M Hours PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount 
-----
114 Turner, Mercedes 
0010312006 2628 M 80.00 1-00 GR 1,440.00 74-00 SS 83.71. 50-01 D 89.71. 85-00 N 1.128.56. 
76-00 FW 91.00 -
77-00SW 47.00 -
0811912006 3055 M 80.00 1-00 GR 1,440 00 74-00 SS 94.65. 50-01 D 89.71. 85-00 N 1.057 66 -
75-00MD 41.76· 
76-00FW 103.00· 
77·00 SW 53.00· 
06124/2006 3088 M 40 00 1-00 GR 720.00 74-00 SS 44.64. 50-01 D 44 86 - 65-00 N 598 06 -
75-00 MD 10.44-
76-00 FW 16.00-
77-00 SW 6 00-
0711412006 3115 70 00 1-00 GR 1,260 00 74-00 SS 158.19 - 50·01 D 158 96 - 85-00 N 1,827 35. 
42 50 2-00 GO 1,147.50 75-00 MD 37.CO· 
8.00 7-00 GR 144.00 76-0'i FW 246.00. 
77-00SW 12400. 
07128/2000 3166 7000 1-00 GR 1,260.00 74-00 SS 132.11. 50-01 D 132.75- 85-00 N 1,553 17. 
32 25 2-00GO 870.75 75-00 MD 30 90-
76-00 FW 186.82. 
77-00 SW 95.00· 
0811212006 3200 70 00 1-00 GR 1,260.00 74-00 SS 132.94 - 50-01 0 133.59. 65-00 N 1.561.92 -
26.75 2-00 GO 722.25' 75.00 MD 31.09-
9.00 4-00 GR 162.00 76-00 FW 188.71. 
77-00 SW 96.CO-
0812512006 3246 70.00 1-00GR 1,260.00 74-00 SS 155.54. 50·01 D 156 30. 85-00 N 1,799 55-
46.25 2-00GO 1,248 75 75-00 MD 36.38 -
76-00FW 239 98. 
77.oosw 121.00. 
09/0912006 3289 7000 1-00GR 1,260.00 74-00 SS 185.59. 50-01 0 166.39. 85-00 N 1,904.27. 
52.25 2-00GO 1,41075 75-00 MD 38 73 -
76-00 FW 262.77. 
77-00 SW 133.CO· 
C9123/2006 3319 70 00 1-00 GR 1.260 00 74-00 SS 159.45- 50-01 D 160 22- 85-00 N 1,839 95. 
42.25 2-00 GO 1,140.75 75-00MO 37.29. 
1.50 4-00 GR 27.00 76-00 FW 246.84 -
8.00 7-00 GR 144.00 77-00 SW 126.00-
10/07/2006 3362 7000 1-00 GR 1,260.00 74-00 SS 176.19- 50·01 D 177.04. 85-00 N 2,014 49 -
58.25 2-00 GO 1,572.75 75-00 MD 41 21 -
.50 4·00 GR 9 00 76-00 FW 266.82. 
77·00 SW 146.00 • 
. . -------------·----------
M=Manual Cnec• 
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Ctty of Lapwai Payroll Summary by Name Page: 
Check Issue Dale(s): 05/0112006 to 02!2812011 Apr 15. 2013 11:40am 
-----
Gross I Expense Taxes Deductions Net/ Info 
Date Check No M Hours PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount 
-·---
114 Turner. Mercedes (continued) 
1012112006 3418 70 00 1-00GR 1,260 00 74-00 SS 172.14. 50..01 D 172 98- 85-00 N 1.707 66 -
45 50 2-00 GO 1,228.50 75·00 MD 40.26· 
6 00 7-00 GR 144 00 76-00 FW 497.46. 
s 00 9-00 GR 14400 77-00 SW 186.00-
1110412006 3485 7000 1-00GR 1,260.00 74-00 SS 160.43- 50-01 D 161.20- 85-00 N 1.602 20. 
49.00 2-00 GO 1,323 00 75-00 MD 37.52-
.25 4-00 GR 4 50 76-00 FW 453.15-
77-00SW 173.00· 
, 111812006 3495 70.00 1-00GR 1,260 00 74·00 SS 177.17. 50-01 D 17802- 65-00 N 1,752 43. 
48.50 2-00 GO 1,309.50 75-00 MD 41.43. 
8.00 4-00 GR 144.00 76-00 FW 516.45. 
8.00 7-00 GR 144 00 77-00SW 192 00. 
12/0212006 3533 70.00 1-00 GR 1,260.00 74-00 SS 183.02. 50-01 D 183.91. 85-00 N 1,804.67. 
52.00 2-00 GO 1,404.00 75-00 MD 42.80. 
16.00 7-00 GR 288 00 76-00 FW 538 60. 
77-00SW 199.00. 
1211612006 3452 7000 1-00 GR 1,260.00 74-00 SS 178.56. 50-01 D 179 42. 65-00 N 1.764 54. 
60.00 2-00GO 1,620 00 75-00 MD 41.76-
76-00 FW 521.72 -
77-DO SW 194.00. 
12/3012006 3465 70.00 1-00 GR 1,260 00 74-00 SS 161.82. 50-01 D 162.60. 85-00 N 1,615 30. 
5000 2-00 GO 1,350 00 75-00 MD 37.85. 
76-00 FW 458.43. 
77-00SW 174.00. 
0111312007 3559 46 00 1-00GR 828.00 74-DO SS 162.87. 50-01 D 16366- 85-00 N 1,623.98. 
50.53 2-00 GO 1,367.01 75-00 MD 38.09. 
2400 7-00 GR 432 00 76-00 FW 462.41 . 
77-DOSW 176.00-
0112712007 3589 6200 1-00 GR 1,115.00 74-00 SS 177.64- 50-01 D 178.50. 85-00 N 1,761 38. 
59 45 2-00GO 1,605.15 75-00MD 41.54-
800 7-00 GR 144.00 76-00 FW 513.09. 
77-00SW 193.00. 
02/1012007 3601 62.00 1-00 GR 1,116.00 74-00 SS 175.63. 50-01 D 176 48. 85-00 N 1,743.08. 
58.25 2-00GO 1,572.75 75-00MD 41.07. 
8 00 4-00 GR 14400 76-00 FW 505 49. 
77-00SW 191 00. 
0212412007 3655 66.75 1-00GR 1,201.50 74·00 SS 289.88. 50-01 0 291.28. 85-00 N 741 46. 
3000 2-00GO 810.00 75-00 MD 67.79. 70-01 D 1.980.00. 
28.00 4-00 GR 504 00 76-00 FW 960.07 -
12000 9-00 GR 2, 160 00 77-00 SW 325.00. 
03110/2007 3699 7000 1-00GR 1,260 00 74·00 SS 369.68. 50-01 0 371 46. s5.no N 3,396 92. 
75.50 2-00GO 2,038.50 75·00 MD 86.46. 
6 00 7-00 GR 144.00 76-00 FW 1,317.98. 
14000 9-00 GR 2.520 00 77-00 SW 420.00. 
·-----· 
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City of Lapwai Payroll Summary by Name Page 
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Gross I Expense Taxes Deducuons Net/Into 
Date Check No M Hours PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount 
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114 Turner, Mercedes {continued} 
03/24.'2007 3722 70.00 1-00GR 1,260 00 74-00 SS 153.03. 50·01 D 153 77. 85-00 N 1,54162. 
44 75 2-00 GO 1.208 25 75-00 MD 35 711-
75-00 FW 42004. 
77-00SW 1&4.00 -
04/0712007 3754 7000 1-00GR 1,26000 74-00 SS 111.80· 50--01 D 11214. 85-00 N 1.171 i7. 
2000 2-00 GO 540 00 75-00MD 26.10-
76-00FW 263.311. 
77-00SW 115.00 -
0412112007 3760 7000 1-00GR 1,260.00 74-00 SS 127.08. 50-01 D 127.70- 85-00 N 1,310 31-
29 25 2-00 GO 789 75 75-00MD 29.72. 
76-00FW 321.94. 
77.00 SW 133.00. 
0510512007 3798 54 50 1-00 GR 981.00 74-00 SS 179.82- 50-01 D 180.69. 85-00 N 1,780 38 -
2775 2-00 GO 749 25 75-00 MD 42.05 -
40.00 4-00 GR 720.00 76-00 FW 521.31 -
25 00 9·00 GR 45000 77-00 SW 196.00-
0511912007 3833 7000 1-00GR 1,260.00 74-00 SS 166.01 - 50-01 0 166.81 - 85-00 N 1,657 76. 
52 50 2-00GO 1,417 50 75-00 MD 38.82. 
75-00 FW 469.10· 
77-00SW 179.00. 
0610212007 3847 70.00 1-00 GR 1,260 00 74-00 SS 165.59 - 50-01 0 166.39 - 85-00 N 1,653 53 -
52.25 2-00 GO 1.410 75 75-00 MD 38 73-
76-00 FW 467.51 -
77-00 SW 179.00. 
()$11612007 3895 65 25 1-00 GR 1,174.50 74-00 SS 103 23. 50-01 D 103.73- 85-00 N 1,09716. 
300 2·00 GO 81.00 75-00MD 24.14 -
12 75 4·00 GR 229.50 76-00 FW 231.74. 
800 7-00 GR 144.00 77-00 SW 105.00 -
2.00 9-00 GR 36.00 
06/30/2007 3932 70.00 1-00GR 1,260.00 74-00 SS 134.48- 50-01 D 135.13. 85-00 N 1,376.05. 
31.00 2-00GO 837.00 75-00MD 3145· 
4.00 4-00GR 72 00 76-00 FW ~49.69 -
77-00 SW 142.00. 
0711412007 3971 70.00 1-00GR 1,260 00 74-00 SS 138.52 - 50-01 0 13919. SS-OON 1.411.95. 
30.75 2-00 GO 830.25 75-00 MD 32.40 -
8.00 7-00GR 144.00 76-00 FW 365.19. 
77-00 SW 147.00. 
0712812007 5008 70 00 1-00GR 1.260.00 74-00 SS 191.95 - 50-01 0 192 88. 85-00 N 1.889 OB -
65 00 2·00 GO 1,762.00 75-00 MD 44 89-
3 00 4-00 GR 54.00 76-00 FW 567.20. 
77-00 SW 210 00 -
08111/2007 5024 69 00 1-00GR 1,242 00 74-00 SS 153 87. 50-01 D 154 61. 65-00 N 1.549 07. 
45 25 2-00 GO 1,221 75 75-00 MD 35 99 -
100 4-00GR 18.00 76-00 FW 423.21 -
77-00 SW 165 00. 
- - -- .. ~ - . - .. ·- -· - ~ . ----- -------
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C•ly of Lapwai Payron Summary by Name Page: 4 
Check Issue Date(s): 05/0112006 lo 02!2812011 Apr 15. 2013 11·4oam 
Gross I Expense Taxes Deductions Net/ Info 
Date Check No M Hours PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount 
.. ___ 
-------
0812512007 5000 66 25 1-00GR 1.192 50 74-00 SS 124.99 - 50-01 D 125.60- 65-00 N 1.29116. 
12 50 2-00GO 337.50 7S-00 MO 29.23-
3 00 4-00 GR 54 00 76-00 FW 314.02 -
24 00 9-00 GR 43200 77-00 SW 131.00-
09108/2007 5072 70 00 1-00GR 1,260.00 74--00 SS 168.52 - 50-01 D 169.33· SS-00 N 1,68015 -
54 00 2-00 GO 1,458.00 75--00 MD 39.41 • 
76-00 FW 476.59. 
77-00 SW 182.00. 
09/2212007 5106 62.00 1-00GR 1,11600 74-00 SS 186.93. 50-01 D 187 83. as--00 N 1.84430-
65 00 2-00 GO 1,755 00 75--00 MD 43.72. 
8 00 7-00 GR 144.00 76-00 FW 548 22. 
77-00 SW 204 00. 
10106/2007 5156 70 00 1-00GR 1,260 00 74-00 SS 187.63. 50-01 0 188 54- 85-DON 1,85035-
54 75 2-00 GO 1,478.25 75·00 MD 43.88. 
16 00 4-00 GR 288 00 76-00 FW 550.85. 
77-00 SW 206 00. 
10/1612007 5187 70 00 1-00GR 2,179.10 74-00 SS 204.83. 50-01 D 205 82- 85-00 N 2,000 23. 
18 75 2-00 GO 875 53 75-00MD 47.90· 
6 00 7-00 GR 249 04 76-00 FW 619.89. 
77--00 SW 225 00. 
1110312007 5202 70 00 1-00GR 2,17910 74-00 SS 135.10. 50-01 D 135.76- 85-00 N 1.381 38. 
75-00 MD 31.60. 
76-00 FW 352.26. 
77-00 SW 143 00-
1111712007 5235 70 00 1-00 GR 2,179.10 74--00 SS 135.10. 50-Cl D 135,76. es.oo N 1,381.38. 
7S-OO MD 31 60-
76-00 FW 352.26. 
77-00 SW 143.00-
'.2/01/2007 5250 70 00 1-00GR 2,179 10 74-00 SS 135.10. 50·01 0 135.76. 65-00 N 1,38138-
75-00MD 31.60. 
76-00FW 352.26 -
77-00 SW 143.00· 
1it15i2007 5279 52.00 1-00 GR 1,61876 74-00 SS 154.40. 50-01 D 15515· 65-00 N 1,553 50. 
28.00 9-00 GR 87164 75-00 MD 36.11-
76-00FW 425.24. 
77-00SW 166.00-
~2!~9!2007 5311 80 00 1-00GR 2,490 40 74-00 SS 154.40. 50-01 0 155 15. 65-00 N 1.553 50. 
75-00 MD 36 11 -
76-00 FW 425 24. 
77-00 SW 166.00. 
0111212008 5333 56 co 1-00GR 1,743 2B 74-00 SS 154.40. 50-01 D 155.15. 85-00 N 1.555 54. 
24 00 7-00 GR 74712 75-00 MD 36.11. 
76-00 FW 423.20. 
77-00SW 166 00-
.. --·····- ~---- ·- ·-·--····· -·-·-·-
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City oi Lapv;ai Payron Summaiy by Name Page: 
Check Issue Date(s): 05101/2006 to 02128/2011 Apr 15, 2013 11 40am 
·-·- ·--·-- ··--
Gross I Expense Taxes Deductions Net/ Info 
Date C~eck No M Hours PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount 
____ _,_ 
···---·---- ---··----
114 Turner. Mercedes (continued) 
0112612008 5358 70 DO 1-00 GR 2, 179 10 74-00 SS 154 40- 50-01 D 15515. 85-00 N 1,555 54. 
10 00 9·00 GR 311 30 75..QOMD 36.11. 
76-00 FW 423.20-
77-00SW 166.00. 
0210812008 5416 70 00 1-00GR 2, 179 10 74-00 SS 154.40. 50-01 D 155.15. 85-00 N 1 ,555 54. 
10.00 9-00 GR 311.30 75-00MD J6.11. 
76-00 FW 423 20-
77-00 SW 16600-
02122/2008 5409 70.00 1-00GR 2, 179. 10 74-00 SS 154.40- 50-01 D 155.15. 85-00 N 1,55554-
10 00 9-00GR 311.30 75-00 MD 36.11. 
76-00 FW 423.20-
77-00SW 166.00-
03/0712008 5434 54 00 1-00 GR 1,681 02 74-00 SS 154.40- 50-01 D 155.15. 65-00 N 1,555 54. 
8 00 4-00 GR 249.04 75-00 MD 36.11-
8 00 7-00 GR 249 04 76-00 FW 423.20. 
10 00 9--00GR 311 30 77-00SW 166 00-
0312112008 5462 66.00 1-00GR 2,054 58 74-00 SS 154.40- 50-01 D 155 15 - 85-00 N 1,555 54. 
4.00 4-00 GR 124.52 75-oo MD 36.11. 
10 00 9-00 GR 311 30 76-00 FW <23.20. 
77-00SW 166 00-
()410412008 5-179 70 00 1-00GR 2,179 10 74-00 SS 154.40 - 50-01 D 15515 - 65-00 N 1,555 54. 
10.00 9-00 GR 311 30 75-00 MD 36.11. 
76-00FW 423.20. 
77-00 SW 168.00. 
04/18/2008 5505 68.00 1-00GR 2,116.84 74-00 SS 154.40. 50-01 D 155.15. 85-00 N 1,555.54. 
2.00 4-00 GR 62.26 75-00 MD 36 11 -
10 00 9-00 GR 311.30 76-00 FW 423.20. 
77-00 SW 166.00. 
0510212008 5536 70.00 1-00GR 2, 179.10 74-00 SS , 54.40. 50-01 0 155.15- 85-00 N 1,555 54. 
10.00 9-00 GR 311.30 75-00 MD 36.11. 
76-00FW 423.20. 
77-00SW 166.00-
0511612008 5561 70 00 1-00GR 2,17910 74-00 SS 154.40. 50-01 D 15515. 85-00 N 1,555 54. 
10 00 9-00 GR 311.30 75-00MD 36.11. 
76·00 FW 423.20. 
77-00SW 166.00-
0513012008 5586 70 00 1-00 GR 2, 179 10 74·00 SS 154 40. 50-01 D 16515. 65-00 N 1,555 54 ' 
10.00 9-00 GR 311 30 75-00MD 36.11. 
76-00FW 423.20. 
77-00 SW 166.00. 
JSl\312008 5605 63.00 1-00GR t,961 19 74-00 SS 154 40· 50-01 0 15515. 85-00 N 1,555 54. 
7 00 7-00 GR 217.91 75-00 MO 36 11. 
10 00 9-00 GR 311 30 76-00 FW 423 20. 
77-00 SW 166.00. 
M~Manual Check 
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM BIG MAN 
Exhibit G 007 
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Checi< Issue Date(s): 05/01/2006 to 0212812011 Apr 15. 2013 ii:40am 
Gross I Expense Taxes Deductions Net/ Info 
Date Check No M Hours PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount 
···---
~ 14 Turner. Mercedes (continued) 
0612312008 562' 70.00 1-00GR 2,179 10 74-00 SS 154.40. 50-01 D 155 15. 65-00 N 1.555 54 . 
1000 9-00GR 311 30 75·00 MD 36.11 • 
76-00 FW 423 20. 
77-0-.1 SW 166.00· 
0711112008 5670 63 00 1-00GR 1,961.19 74-00 SS 154.40- 50-01 D 155.15 - 65-00 N 1.55554· 
7.00 7-00 GR 217 91 75-00 MO 36.11-
10 00 9-00 GR 311 30 76-00 FW 423.20 -
77-oosw 166.00. 
0712512008 5694 35 00 1-00GR 1,089 55 74-00 SS 154.40. 50-01 D 155.15- e5-oo N 1,55554. 
35 00 4-00 GR 1,089.55 75-00 MD 36 11 -
10 00 9-00GR 311 30 76-00 FW 423.20-
77-00 SW 166 00-
08106/2008 5718 7000 1-00GR 2,179.10 74-00 SS 154.40· 50-01 0 15515. 85-00 N 1,555 54. 
10.00 9-00 GR 311 30 75-00 MD 36. 11. 
76·00 FW 423.20-
77-00SW 166.00-
0812212008 5749 70 00 1-00GR 2,179.10 74·00 SS 154.40- 50-01 0 15515- 85·00 N 1,555.54 -
10.00 9-00 GR 311 30 75-00MO 36.11 • 
76-00 FW 423.20-
77-0l)SW 166 00-
09105/2008 5779 35 00 1-00GR 1,089.55 74-00 SS 13510. 50-01 D 135.76. 85-00 N 1,383 42. 
35.00 3·01 GR 1,069.55 75-00 MO 31.60. 
76-00FW 350.22. 
77..00 SW 143.00-
09/1912008 5816 63 00 1-00GR 1,961 19 74-00 SS 135.10. 50-01 0 135 76 - 85·00 N 1,383.42 -
7 00 7·00 GR 217 91 75-00 MO 31.60. 
76-00 FW 350 22. 
77-00SW 143.00-
1010312008 5828 7000 1-00GR 2.17910 74-00 SS 13510- 50-01 0 135.76- 85-00 N 1.383 42. 
75-00 MO 31.60-
75-00 FW 350.22-
77-00SW 143 00-
10/;712008 5865 70 00 1·00GR 2,179 10 74-00 SS 135.10· 50-01 D 135.76· 85-00 N 1,383 42. 
75-00 MO 31.60· 
76-00 FW 350.22. 
77-00 SW 14300. 
10131/2008 5900 63 00 f·OO GR 1,961.19 74-00 SS 135.10. 50-01 0 135.76. 65·00 N 1.383 42. 
7 00 7-00 GR 217.91 75-00 MD 31.60-
76-00 FW 350 22. 
77-00 SW 143.00· 
1111412006 5926 7000 f-OOGR 2,244.41! 74-00 SS 147 23. 50-01 0 147 94. 85-00 N 1,492 01. 
140 00 6-D2GM 130 20 75..QO MO 34.43. 
76-00 FW 396.07. 
n-oosw 157 00 -
--· . - --~ ·····---- __ , -·. -· ·-· ·-· ·-· 
M~Manwai Check 
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114 Turner, Merce<les (continued) 
1112512008 5956 63 00 1-00GR 2.020.03 74-00 SS 139.16- 50-01 D 139.63. 85-00 N 1,419 39. 
7 00 7-00 GR 224.45 75-00 MO 32.55· 
76-00 FW 365.55-
77-00SW 148.00-
1211112008 5986 56.00 1-00GR 1.795.58 74-00 SS 139. 16. 50-01 D 139 83. 65-00 N 1,419 39. 
14 00 7-00 GR 448 90 75-00 MD 32.55-
76·00 FW 365.55. 
77-00 SW 148.QO. 
12/2412008 4024 38 00 1-00GR 1,218.43 74-00 SS 139.16. 50-01 D 139 83. 85-00 N 1,419 39. 
32 00 S-00 GR 1,026 05 75-0-0 MD 32 55. 
76-00FW 365.55. 
77-00SW 148 00-
0110812009 4057 22 00 1-00GR 705.41 74-00 SS 139 16 - 50-01 D 139 83- 65-00 N 1,419 39. 
21 00 7·00 GR 673 34 75-00 MD 32.55-
27 00 9-00 GR 865.73 76-00 FW 365 55. 
77-00 SW 148 00-
0112212009 4099 7000 1-00GR 2,24448 74-00 SS 139.16· 50-01 D 139.83 - 65-00 N 1.425 12. 
75-00 MD 32.55· 
76-00 FW 359.62. 
77-00 SW 148 00-
0210..">12009 4135 63 00 1-00 GR 2,020 03 74-00 SS 139.16. 50-01 D 139.63- 85-00 N 1,42512. 
7.00 7-00 GR 224 45 75-00MD 32.55. 
76-00 FW 359.82-
77-00 SW 146.00-
0211912009 4178 7000 1-00GR 2,244.46 74-00 SS 139.16. 50·01 D 139.83. 85-00 N 1,42512 -
75-00 MD 32.55-
76-00 FW 359.82. 
77-00SW 146.00. 
0310512009 4189 52 25 1-00 GR 1,675 34 74-00 SS 139 16. 50-01 D 139 83. 85--00 N 1.425 13. 
9 75 4-00GR 312 62 75-00 MD 32 54-
8 00 7-00 GR 256.51 76-00 FW 359.81-
77·00 SW 148.00· 
0311912009 4271 70 00 1-00GR 2,244 48 74·00 SS 13916. 50·01 D 139.83. 85-00 N 1.42512· 
75-00MD 32 55-
76-00FW 359 82 -
77-00 SW 148.00. 
04102/2009 4242 70.00 1-00GR 2,244 45 H-OOSS 139.15. 50-01 D 139 83 - 85-00 N 1.44562. 
75-00 MD 3255-
75-00 FW 339.32. 
77-00SW 148 00-
04/i612009 4257 70 00 9-00 GR 2,244 48 74-00 SS 139.16. 50-01 D 131'83- 85-00 N 1,445.62. 
75-00MD 32.55. 
76-00 FW 339.32. 
77-00 SW 148.00. 
···--·-·-·~-- ... - .. ~·-·-· -· - - ·- . ~----·· .. 
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, 14 Turner, Mercedes (cont1nueC1) 
0413012009 4310 70 00 1-00GR 2.244 48 74-00 SS 13916' 50-01 0 139 83. 85-00 N 1,44562· 
75-00 MO 32.55' 
76-00 FW 339 32. 
77-00 SW 148.00. 
0511412009 4350 70 00 1-00GR 2,24448 74-00 SS 139,16. 50-01 D 139.83. 85-00 N 1,445 62-
75-00 MO 32,55. 
76-00 FW 339 32. 
77-00 SW 148.00. 
0512612009 4365 25 50 t-OOGR 817.63 74-00 SS 139.16. 50-01 0 139 83. 85-00 N 1,445 62' 
36 50 3-01 GR 1, 170.34 75--00 MD 32.55. 
8 00 7-00 GR 256.51 76-00 FW 339.32 -
77·00 SW 148 00 -
06111/2009 4362 60,00 1-00 GR 1,923.84 74-00 SS 139.16. 50-01 D 139 83. 85·00 N 1.44562' 
2 00 3-01 GR 64.13 75·00 MD 32. 55 -
8.00 7-00 GR 256 51 76·00 FW 339 32. 
77-00 SW 148.00 • 
0612512009 4409 70 00 1-00 GR 2,244 48 14-00 SS 13916. 50-01 D 139.83. 85-00 N 1.445 62. 
75-00MD 32.55· 
76-00 FW 339,32. 
77-00 SW 148,00. 
:G710Si2009 4420 41 00 1-00GR 1,314.62 74-00 SS 139 16. 50-01 D 139.83. B5-00 N 1,445.63. 
21 00 3-01 GR 673 34 75-00 MD 32.54 -
8 00 7-00 GR 256.51 76-00 FW 339 31. 
77-00SW 148.00-
0712312009 4462 7000 3-01 GR 2,244.48 74-00 SS 139.16. 50-01 0 139.83. 85-00 N 1,445 62. 
76-00 MD 32.55. 
76·00FW 339.32. 
77-00 SW 148.00. 
0810612009 4488 70 00 1-00GR 2,244 4tl 74-00 SS 139.16· 50-01 D 139.63- 85-00 N 1,445 62. 
75-00MO 32.55. 
76-00 FW 339,32. 
77-00SW 146.00. 
0812112009 4512 70.00 1-00GR 2,244,46 74-00 SS 139.16. 50-01 D 139.83. 85·00 N 1,445.62' 
75-00MD 32.55. 
76-00 FW 339,32. 
77-00 SW 148,00. 
0910312009 4525 60 00 1-00GR 1,923.84 74·00 SS 13916. 50·01 D 139.63. 85-00 N 1.445 62' 
10 00 9·00 GR 32064 75-00 MD 32 55. 
76-00 FW 339.32. 
77-00SW 148 00. 
0911 ?/2009 4562 57 00 1-00 GR 1,827 65 74-00 SS 139.16 - 50-01 D 139 63. 85-00 N 1 445 62 . 
8 00 7-00 GR 256 51 75-00 MD 3255. 
5 00 9-00 GR 180.32 76-00 FW 339.32. 
77-00 SW 146.00. 
·------
M=Manual Check 
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM BIG MA.i~ 3~ 
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City or Lapwai Payroll Summaiy by Name Page: 9 
Check Issue Oate(s): 05/0112006 to 0212812011 Apr 15. 2013 11:40am 
Gress I Expense Taxes Deductions Net/Info 
Date Check No M Hours PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount 
114 Turner. Mercedes {continued) 
1010112009 4582 66 00 1-00GR 2,116.22 74-00 SS 139.16 - 50-01 D 139.63. B!>-00 N 1,445 62. 
4.00 9-00GR 126 26 75-00 MD 32.55. 
76-00 FW 339.32. 
77-00 SW 148 OQ. 
10115/2009 4606 17 50 1-00GR 56112 74-00 SS 139.16 - 50-01 0 139 83- 85-00 N 1,445 62-
49 50 3-01 GR 1,587 17 7!>-00 MO 32.55. 
3.00 4-00 GR 96.19 76-00 FW 339.32. 
77-00 SW 148 00-
10/2912009 4530 70.00 1·00GR 2,244 46 74-00 SS 139.16- 50-01 0 139 83. 85-00 N 1,445 62. 
75·00 MD 32.55. 
76-00 FW 339.32 -
77-00SW 148.00· 
11/12/2009 4546 58 50 1-00GR 1.875 74 74-00 SS 139.16· 50-01 D 139 83 - 85·00 N 1.445.62. 
11 50 4-00GR 368 74 75·00 MD 32.55. 
76-00 FW 339.32 -
77-00SW 148.00. 
1112612009 4674 54 00 1-00GR 1,731.46 74·00 SS 139.16. 50-01 D 139 83. 85·00 N 1,445 62 -
8.00 7-00 GR 256.51 75-00MD 32.55. 
e.oo 9-00 GR 256.51 76-00FW 339.32. 
77-00SW 148.00· 
1211(}/2009 4698 2 00 1-00GR 64 13 74-00 SS 155.06· 50-01 D 155 81. 65-00 N 1.588.41. 
16 00 7-00 GR 513.02 75-00 MD 3e.26. 
60 00 9·00GR 1,923.84 76-00 FW 399.45. 
77-00SW 166.00· 
12/2312009 4722 70 00 1-00GR 2,244 48 74-00 SS 139.16· 50-01 D 139.63. 85-00 N 1,445.62. 
75·00 MD 32 55. 
76-00FW 339.32. 
77-00 SW 148.00· 
Employee Range Totals 
5,827 50 1-00GR 150,926.67 74·0<) SS 14,223.30. 50-01 D 14,292.12· 85-00 N 143,866.33 . 
1,486.83 2-00 GO 40.513 69 75-00 MD 3,326.55. 70-01 D 1,980.00. 
214 00 3-01 GR 6,629.01 76-00FW 36,903.52 -
208.25 4-00GR 4,732 92 77-00 SW 14,817.00. 
293 00 7-00 GR 7,756.06 
140 00 8-02 GM 130 20 
723 00 9-00 GR 18,520 27 
--···--- ---·------· 
8,892.58 229,406.82 69,270.37 - 16.272.12· 143.666.33. 
-~--------
-----------· ·---·-·· --~·· 
M=Manual Check 
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM BIG MAN 
Fxhibit G 011 
City or Lapwai Payroll Summary by Name Page: 10 
Check Issue Oate(s): 05/0112006 to 0212&12011 Apr15. 2013 11:40am 
-------·---·-~--~-----------------------------------------·--~--·-·--
Gross I E.xpense 
Date Check No M Hours PC Typ Amount 
- ------
Grand Totals: Range Totals 
5,827 50 1-00GR 150,1126.67 
l,4S6Jl3 2-00 GO 40,513.69 
214.00 3-01 GR e.s2s.01 
206.25 4·00GR 4,732.82 
293.00 7-00GR 1,1se.oe 
140.00 8-02 GM 130.20 
723.00 9-00GR 18.520.2.7 
e,s92.sa 229,408.82 
Report Criteria: 
Employee.Emp No = 114 
M=Manual Check 
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM BIG MAN 
Taxe11 
PC Typ Amount 
74-00 SS 14,223.30 -
75-00 MO 3,326.55. 
76-00 FW 36,903.52. 
77-00SW 14,817.00. 
69,270.37. 
Deductions Net I Info 
PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount 
------ -----·----·-
50-01 D 
70-01 0 
14,2ll2.12 • 85-00 N 
1,980.00. 
16,272.12. 
143,866.33 -
143,866.33 -
-------- ----------- .. -
37 
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City of Lapwai Payroll Summary by Name Page: 
Check Issue Date(s): 0110712010 to 021281201 l Apr 15, 2013 11:43am 
Report Criteria: 
Empioyee Emp No= 114 
Gress I Expense Taxes Deductions Nett Info 
Date Check No M Hours PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount 
- ------ .... -· 
114 Turner. Mercedes 
0110712010 4741 22 00 1-00GR 705 41 74-00 SS 155.05· 50-01 D 155 81. 65-00 N 1,583 54. 
24 00 7-00GR 769.54 75-00 MD 36.26. 
32.00 9-01 GR 1,026 05 76·00FW 404.33. 
77-00SW 166 00-
0112112010 4767 70 00 l·OOGR 2,244.48 74-00 SS 139.16· 50-01 D 13983· 85-00 N 1.440 75. 
75-00 MD 32.55· 
76-00 FW 344.Hl· 
77-00 SW 148.00· 
02/0412010 4793 62.00 1-00GR 1,987.97 74-00 SS 139.16. 50-01 0 139.63. 85-00 N l.440 75. 
8 00 7-00 GR 256 51 75-00 MD 32.55. 
76-00 FW 344.19. 
77·00 SW 148.00. 
0211812010 4819 69 25 1-00GR Z,220.43 74-00 SS 139.16. 50-01 D 139 83. 85·00 N 1,440 75. 
75 9-01 GR 24.05 75-00 MD 32.55. 
76-00 FW 34419. 
77-00 SW 146 00. 
0310412010 4842 SS 50 1-00 GR 1.81162 74-00 SS 13916. 50-01 0 139 83· 8!>-00 N 1,440 75. 
6 00 7-00 GR 256.51 75-00 MD 32.55. 
5.50 9·01 GR 176 35 76-00 FW 344 19. 
77-00SW 148.00-
0311812010 4870 70.00 1-00GR 2,24448 74-00 SS 139.16. 50·01 D 139.83· 85·00 N 1,440.75. 
75-00 MD 32.55. 
76-00 FW 34419. 
77-00 SW 146.00. 
0•10112010 4663 62.50 1-00GR 2,004 00 74-00 SS 139.16. 50-01 0 139.83· 65-00 N 1,440 75. 
7 50 4-00 GR 240.48 75-00 MD 32.55. 
76-00 FW 344.19· 
77-00 SW 148.00· 
Oq/1512010 4910 60 00 1·00 GR 1,923.84 74-00 SS 139.16. 50-01 D 139.83. 8!>-00 N 1,440 75. 
10.00 4-00 GR 32064 75·00 MO 32 55. 
76-00 FW 344 19· 
77-00SW 148.00· 
0412912010 4950 66 75 1-00 GR 2.140 27 74·00 SS 139.16· 50-01 0 139 63. 85-00 N 1,440 75. 
3 25 9-01 GR 104.21 75-00 MD 32.55· 
76-00FW 344.19· 
77·00 SW 148 00. 
0511212010 4966 64 00 1-00GR 2.052.10 74·00 SS 139.16· 50-01 0 139.83. 85-00 N 1.440 75. 
6.00 4·00 GR 192.38 75-00MD 32.55. 
76-00 FW 344.19. 
77·00 SW 148.00-
M=Manuar Check 
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM BIG MAN 
i=Yhihit (:; 01 ~ 
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C 1ty of Lapwai Payroll Summary by Name Page: 
Check Issue Date(s): 0110712010 to 02128/2011 Apr 15, 2013 11A3am 
Gross I Expense Taxes Deductions Netflnfo 
Dale Check No M Hours PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount 
114 Tcrner, Mercedes (continued) 
0512712010 6009 4675 1-00GR 1,498.99 74-00 SS 139.16. 50-01 D 13983- 85-00 N 1,44075-
8 00 7-00 GR 256 51 75-00 MD 32.55. 
15 25 \l-01 GR 466 98 76-00 FW 344.19. 
77-00SW 148.00. 
0611012010 6033 72 00 1-00GR 2,308.61 74-00 SS 159 04. 50-01 D 159 81. 85-00 N 1.618 72. 
B 00 7-00 GR 256.51 75-00MD 37 19. 
76·00 FW 419.36. 
77-00SW 171.00-
0612412010 6056 8000 1-00GR 2,565 12 74-00 SS 159.04. 50-01 D 159.81. 85-00 N 1,618 72 -
75-00MD 37.19. 
76-00FW 419 36 -
77-oosw 171 00-
0710812010 6072 72 00 1-00 GR 2,308.61 74-00 SS 159.04. 50-01 D 159 81. 65-00 N 1,616 72-
8.00 7-00 GR 256.51 75-0'J MD 37 19. 
76-00 FW 419.36 -
77-oosw 171.00. 
0712212010 6114 41.75 1-00GR 1,338.67 74-00 SS 159.04. 50-01 0 159.81- 85-00 N 1,618 72. 
38.25 4-00 GR 1,226 45 75-00 MD 37. 19 -
76-00 FW 419.36. 
77--00SW 171.00. 
081051;1-010 6144 60.00 1-00 GR 2,565.12 74-00 SS 159.04. 50-01 D 159.81. 85-00 N 1,618 72-
75-00 MD 37.19 -
76-00 FW 419.36. 
77-00 SW 17100. 
0811912010 6172 72 25 1-00 GR 2,316 62 7.\-00 SS 159 04. 50-01 D 159 81. 65-00 N 1,618 72 -
7 75 9-01 GR 248.50 75--00MD 37 19. 
76-00FW 419.36. 
77-00 SW 171.00. 
09/0212010 6184 80 00 1-00 GR 2,565.12 74-00 SS 159.04. 50·01 D 159 81. 85-00 N 1,618 72. 
7$-00 MD 37.19. 
76-00 FW 419 36. 
77-00 SW 171 00. 
0911612010 6230 72.00 1-00GR 2,308.61 74·00 SS 159.04 - 50-01 D 159 81. 65-00 N 1.e1e.12. 
6 00 7-00 GR 25651 75-00 MD 37.19. 
76-00 FW 419.36. 
77·00 SW 171.00. 
0913012010 6250 60.00 1-00GR 2,565 12 74-00 SS 159.04. 50-01 D 159 81. 85-00 N 1,618.72. 
75--00 MD 37. 19. 
76-00 FW 419.36. 
77-00 SW 171 00. 
10114/2010 6275 80 00 1-00GR 2,565.12 74-00 SS 159.04. 50·01 D 159 81. 85-00 N 1,618 72 -
75-00 MD 57.19. 
76-00 FW 419 38. 
77-00 SW 171.00 -
. - ,-------~~----· -
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114 Turner. Mercedes ( conlinued) 
1012812010 6314 39 25 1·00GR 1,258.51 74-00 SS 159.04. 50-01 D 159.81 - 85-00 N 1,618 72. 
40.75 9-01 GR 1,306.61 75-00 MD 37.19. 
76-00FW 419.36-
77-00SW 171.00. 
ii/1012010 6347 80.00 9-01 GR 2,565.12 74-00 SS 159.04- 50-01 D 159 81. 85-00 N 1,616 72-
75-00 MD 37.19-
76-00 FW 419 36. 
77-00 SW 171.00. 
11124/2010 6335 80 00 1-00GR 2,585.12 74--00 SS 159 04. 50-01 D 159.61. 85-00 N 1,618.72-
75-00 MD 37.19· 
76--00 FW 419.36. 
77-00SW 171.00 -
l2109/2C10 6384 14 00 1-00GR 448.90 74-00 SS 159.04. 50-01 D 159 81. 85-00 N 1,616.72. 
50 00 4-00 GR 1,603.20 75-00 MD 3719. 
15 00 7-00 GR 513.02 7S-OO FW 419 36-
77--00 SW 171.00. 
1212212010 6417 25 50 1-00GR 817.63 74-00 SS 159 04. 50-01 D 15981. 85-00 N 1,616 72. 
54 50 4-00 GR 1.74749 75--00 MD 37 19. 
76-00 FW 419.36. 
77-00 SW 171 00-
0110512011 6441 54 75 1-00 GR 1,755.50 74-00 SS 107.74. 50-01 D 159.81. 85-00 N 1.657 28-
1.25 4-00 GR 40.08 75-00 MD 3719. 
24 00 7-00 GR 769.54 76-00 FW 432.10-
77-00SW 171.00-
0112012011 6477 84 00 1-00GR 2,893.38 74--00 SS 2,14561 - 50-01 D 167 ao. 85-00 N 31.111 25. 
611.00 3·02 GM 19,591.10 75-00 MD 740.75. 
898 25 9·02 GM 28,601.49 76-00 FW 16,920.55. 
0210312011 6477 M S4 00. 1·00 GR 2,693.38 - 74-00 SS 2.145.61 50-01 D 167 so 85-00 N 31,111 26 
611 00- 3-02 GM 19,591.10. 75-00MD 740.75 
898 25. 9-02 GM 28,601 49. 76-00FW 18,920.55 
02/0312011 6487 61 75 1-00 GR 2.,621 23 74-00 SS 137.55. 50·01 D 204.03. 85-00 N 2,064 43-
B 26 2-00 GO 397.27 75-00 MD 47.49. 
B 00 7-00 GR 256 $1 76-00 FW 598.51. 
77-00 SW 223 00 -
E~p!oyee Range Totals 
1,675 00 1-00GR 53.707 20 74-00 SS 4.177.55 - 50-01 D 4.315.10. 85-00 N 43.993 55. 
6 26 2-00 GO 397.27 75-00 MD 1.004 29. 
00 3-02 GM 00 76-00 FW 11,167.24. 
167 50 4·00 GR 5,370 72 77.00 SW 4,605.00. 
120 00 7-00GR 3.647 87 
185 25 S-01 GR 5,939 67 
00 9-02 GM 00 
-----
--------. ··-
2,156 01 69,262 73 20,954.06 - 4,31510· 43,993 55. 
-·--·---··----···-··. ·····--·---- --·-·----------~ ~·· ----·-··----· 
M=Manual C~ec< 
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM BIG MAN l{-{) 
-
..... - -~ -
··------------- -----------
City of Lapwai Payroll Summary by Name Page: 4 
Chad\ Issue Dale{>): 01107/2010 to 0212812011 Apf15, 2013 11:43am 
. _ _. .. _, .. - ---·------- .. - -·-__ ,, _______ _ 
Gross I Expense Taxes Deductions Net/ Info 
Date Check No M Hours PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount PC Typ Amount 
·-------- --·-- - ------ --------·· --·----·------ _________ ,._....,.,._ -------·---- .. 
Grand Totals: Ran11e Totals 
Report Criteria· 
Employee Emp No = 114 
M =Manual Check 
1,675.00 
826 
.00 
167 50 
12000 
185 25 
.00 
2,156.01 
1-00 GR 53,707.20 
2-00 GO 397.27 
3-02 GM . 00 
4..00 GR 5,370.72 
7-00GR 3,847.67 
9-01 GR 5,939.67 
9-02GM .00 
69,262.73 
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM BIG MAN 
74-00 SS 
75-00 MO 
76-00 FW 
77-00SW 
4,177.55- 50-01 D 
1,00429-
11,167.24 • 
4,605.00. 
20,954.08 -
4,315.10. 85-00 N 43,993 55. 
4,316.10. 43,993.56 -
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Joshua D. McKarcher 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 743-6538 
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 3737 
ISB No. 9180 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Lapwai 
FILED 
Wl3tVL 3 RP>~~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
MERCEDES TURNER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF LAPWAI, an Idaho municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
State of Idaho ) 
: SS. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
Case No. CV-2012-2587 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
BENTLEY G. STROMBERG, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an adult citizen of the United States, competent to testify as a witness 
and make this affidavit on personal knowledge. 
2. I am the attorney for defendant in this matter. 
AFFIDAVIT OF COlJNSEL 
··.-.------------------.-----------------------------------..:0 
3. Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of documents produced on a page Bates 
stamped TURNER000263 by the plaintiff during discovery in this matter. 
4. Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of a document produced on a page 
Bates stamped TlJRNER000014 by the plaintiff during discovery in this matter. 
Sworn and subscribed to before me this 2nd day of July, 2013. 
Notary Public in°"'and for the State of Idaho, 
R 'd' ( \,., -es1 mg at ( /kO r/11 o . 
My commission expires l 0 ... I Y- .::;.o 17 
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of July, 2013, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
John M. Howell 
Matthew G. Gunn 
Brassey, Crawford & Howell, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1009 
Boise, ID 83701-1009 
U.S. MAIL 
HAt-..1) DELIVERED 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
TELECOPY (J'a,,to .. i: .. 2QY;M8, . ?/Ji 7 / l ril' '• / I//! ( • , I I// 
r i ' /J 
.t\FFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL -2-
Exhibit A 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
Turner, Mercedes 
EMP#: 114 ' 
STATEMENT OF EARNINGS & DEOUCilOi-.., 
PAY PERJOD ENDING: 1/0112011 
04';1 
1/05/2011 6441 
EARNINGS ~~~~~-'OEOUCTIONS.~~~~~-
PERIOD __ YEAR_TO_OATE __ _PERJOD _ 
_rm..e_ 
_ HOU~S- _ RATS_ _AMOUNT _ _HOURS_ _AMOUNT __ rrrt..e_ _AMOUNT~ 
144.93-
432.10· 
111.00-
t59.S1 • 
YR_TO_OATE 
_AMOUNT _ 
Regular 54.15 32..0040 
Overtime .oo 48.0960 
Vacatien .oo 32.004C 
Sick Leave 1.25 S2.0!S40 
1,7$$.50 
.00 
.00 
40.08 
54.75 1.756.SO FICA 
.00 .00 fWT 
.{..o .oo swr 
1.25 40.0S PERS! 
144.!i3. 
432.iO· 
171.00-
159.81 • 
Ho!idey 24.00 32.0$40 78$.54 24.00 759.54 F'ERSl-loan .00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
Call Out .00 32.0540 
Comp Time .00 32.064C 
TOTAL EARNINGS 
TOTAi. 050UCT!ONS 
.oo 
.00 
2,565.12 
907.84-
.00 .00 AA.AC 
.oo .ao Mis<:Ded 
2.585.12 m oeo 
007.84. 
907.54- 907.54-
NET PAY 1.657.28 1.657.28 aeam ACCRUet) USED REMAIN 
VAC 
SICK 
COMP 
CAL.I. 
476.00 .... .00 .oo 47&.00 
ea.so 4.oo 1.25 71.25 
898.25 .OQ .00 896.25 
.00 .00 .oo ,00 
Tumer, Mercedes . 
EMP#: 114 
STATBllENT OF EARNINGS & DEDUCTIONS 
PAY PERIOD ENDING: 1115/2011 1/20/Z011 
6477 
6477_ 
_ ____ __.DEDUCTIONS. _____ _ _________ EARNINGS, _____________ _ 
-~--~~~--PER.100._~- __ YEAR_TO_DATE_ _PERIOD_ YR_TO_DATE 
_nru_ _HOURS_ _RATE_ _AMOUNT_ _HOURS_ _AMOUNT __ Tm.E_ 
_AMOUNT_ _AMOUNT_ 
Regular 84.00 32.~. 2,693.38 
Overttme .00 48.0960 .00 
Vacation. 611.00 32.0640 19,591.10 
Sicic Leave .00 32.0540 .oo 
Holiday .00 32.0540 .00 
Calf Out .00 32.0640 .00 
Comp Time 898.25 32.0640 ZB,801.49 
TOTAL EARNlNGS 51,085.97 
TOTALDEOUCTIONS 19,974.71-
NET PAY 31,111.26 
Vom 
136.75 
.00 
611.00 
1.25 
24.00 
.00 
898.25· 
4,448.88 
.00 
19,591.10 
.w.oa 
769.54 
.00 
28,801.49 
53,651.09 
20,882.55-
32,768.54 
VAC 
SICK 
COMP 
CALI. 
ACA 
FWT 
SWT 
PERS! 
?~n 
AFLAC 
Misc:Oed 
TILDED 
BEGIN 
47$.00 
71.25 
898.25 
.oo 
2.SSS.36- 3,031.29 -
16,9Z0.55 - 17,352.85 -
.00 171.00-
167.80- 327.61 -
.00 .oo 
.00 .00 
.00 .00 
----'-
19,974.71- 20,882.55-
ACCRUED USED REMAIN 
135.00 .00 511.00 
4.00 .00 75.25 
.oo .00 898..25 
.oo .00 .00 
Turner, Mercedes 
EMP #: 114 STATEMENT OF EARNINGS & DEDUCTIONS Q487 
---------EARNINGS~~---?A-Y-PERl--:-0:::0-EN_OfN_G_: _112_9_m;;_11 ~011 6 4 8 7 
_ TITLE_ 
Regular 
Overtime 
Vacation 
Sick leave 
Holiday 
Ca!!Out 
Comp Time 
"""":".::::::=:-----PERIOD _YEAR TO DATE ------DEDUCTIONS. _____ _ 
_HOURS_ _RA.TS_ _AMOUNT_ _HOURS: JMOUNT __ Tm.E_ _PERIOD_ YR_ro_OATE 
81.7S 32.0640 ., 621 .,.. _AMOUNT_ _AMOUNT_ 
a ,.,,. ,.., ~ 136.50 4,376.73 Fl"'" 
'""' 48.0960 397.2.7 """ 
NET PAY 
moeo 
00 a . .ze . ~12.7 FWf 
. 32.0540 .oo 00 
.oo 32.054-0 00 • · .oo swr S.O/J 32.0840 . ,.25 40,08 PERSI 
.00 32.064o 255·51 32.00 1,026.0S PERSl-1.oan 
00 .00 .00 .00 AFLAC 
. 3Z.OS4a .oo 00 
TOTAL EARNINGS . .QQ Mi$C Ded 
3.275.01 !i "·"' 13 TOTAL DEDUCTIONS 1,210.58- •"""'· 
2.118..42. 
2,004.43 3,721.71 
135.04. 
598.51. 
223.00-
204.03-
.00 
.00 
.00 
1,210.sa-
329.97-
1,030.51 -
394.00-
363.84-
.oo 
.oo 
.oo 
2,118.42. 
~~ VIT OF COUNSEL VAC SICK COMP 
CALI. 
BEGIN 
611.00 
75.25 
$98.25 
.00 
ACCRUED 
.00 
.oo 
.oo 
useo 
.oo 
.00 
.oo 
.oo 
REMAIN 
611.00 
75.25 
898.25 
.oo .oo L/S 
·------.------------·--------:-:-:-:-~-:- :-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-~ :;::.->:::-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-: 
ExhibitB 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
Turner, Mercedes 
EMP#: 114 
STATEMENT OF EARNINGS & DEDUCT! 
PAY PERIOD ENDlNG: 71 ~ 
~~-~~~-~~~EARNINGS.~~-_,.~-~-~--:;,.,._..,...__,~ ~""°~4'-~-~-
________ PERIOD. __ _ 
_ TITLE __ HOURS_ RATE __ AMOUNT_ 
Regular 
Overtime 
Vacation 
Sick Leave 
Holiday 
Misc Pay 
Comp Time 
70.00 
32.25 
.00 
.00 
.00 
~CHECKS UNLIMITED'~ • CLASSIC 81.UE • TO REORDER: 1-000-667-2439 • www.Checl<sUnlimited.com 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
6,164.84 
1Tl OED 
VAC 
SICK 
COMP 
577.58. 
BEGIN ACCRUED 
.00 .00 
16.00 4.00 
42.50 .oo 
3166 
_AMOUNT _ 
633.60. 
642.82. 
325.00 -
515.99. 
.00 
.00 
.00 
2,117.41. 
USED REMAIN 
.00 .OC 
.00 20.0( 
.00 42 5{ 
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John M. Howell, ISB No. 6234 
Matthew G. Gunn, ISB No. 8763 
BRASSEY, CRAWFORD & HOWELL. PLLC 
203 W. Main Street 
P.O. Box 1009 
Boise. Idaho 83701-1009 
Telephone: (208) 344-7300 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
F\LED 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICifti DISTFJCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OJf NEZ 
MERCEDES TURNER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF LAPWAI; and DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 12-02587 
PLAINTIFFf S Wi:.E1'fORAJ~DUiv1 
OPPOSITION TO DEF.iI:NJJANT'f-~ 
MOTION FOR SlJ1\![r\r.thJlY 
JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, Mercedes Turner, by and through her cmmscl of record, B.rn~:scy, 
Crawford & Howell, PLLC, and hereby respectfully submits this Memorandum in Opposilion tu 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. This Opposition is based upon the parers 
pleadings of record, and is supported by the Affidavit of Mercedes Tum er filed conlempon1rn.::rm;;J y 
herewith. 
I. INTRODUCflON 
The Defendant City of Lapwai (the "'City") asks the court to grant smm1rnry judgn1cn1 in its 
favor as to all of Mrs. Turner's claims for two reasons: (1) Mrs. Turner's alleged failed to provide 
the City with notice of her claims against it; and (2) the alleged u.ritimeliness of:rvirs. Turner's claim.s. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMtvIARY 
JUDGMENT-1 
Jul ,23 2013 3:27PM B EY CRAWFORD AND HOW 20 7077 
The City's motion should be denied because Mrs. Turner provided suffiderit notice of :>ll cl;:; 1:: 
to the City, which the City in turn acknowledged. Nor are Mrs. Turner's claims timc-bnncd 1:·i: 
the City erroneously argues that an incorrect, six montl1 limitations period applic:;. 
correct two-year limitations period, Mrs. Turner's claims are timely. 
IL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mrs. Turner was hired by the City to serve as the City's clerk and treasurer ju 1v£ay of 
(Affidavit of Mercedes Turner ("Turner Aff."), 12.) Mrs. Turner was a1so cornpcrnmterl for 
performedfortheCity'swater,sewer,andstreetdepartments. (TumerAff.i ~3.) M.xs. Turner u·d 
with the City Council and David Fazzio, then the City's mayor, that_ M;s. ,Turner wuuk[ be nn 
annual salary on the basis of a thirty-five hour work week, with Fridays off. (Turner Aff, l['l.) 
addition to the annual salary, Mayor Fazzio and the City Council agreed tlmt Mrs. 
accrue compensatory time ("comp time") at a one-to-one ration for every hour thal. she Jn 
excess of her required thirty-five hours during a given work week. (Turner Aff., 'lJS .) M rn. rncr :: 
comp time would be paid at the rate equal to her hourly salary up to 40 .hours, and at a rate of l .5 
times her hourly salary for over 40 hours. Id. Mrs. Turner's comp time was to be paid upon hcI 
termination or departure from employment with the City. Id. At the time this agreerncnt was :·.rndc, 
the City was suffering a budgetary crisis, and Mr. Fazzio and Mrs. Turner agreed thul comp lime, 
in lieu of overtime pay, would benefit the City fiscally because Lhe City \vould not \;) 
compensate Mrs. Turner for all her overtime during each pay period. (Turner AfI, 16.) 
:Mrs. Turner was a diligent worker, often working long hours_, nights, an.cl week.ends due to 
the demands placed on her by virtue of the understaffed and dis0rg<trrizcd stu.te of 
municipal government. (Turner Aff., iJ7.) The City had no methodology by which foe pcuy 
expenses attendant to its operation were to be paid. (Turner Aff., ,8.) Mrs. Turner Jcgl1lady pajd 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUJviMARY 
JUDGMENT-2 
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for such petty expenses withherpersonal money, and often distributed her personal i:"uncy to 
City employees in order to allow them to pay for the City's petty expenses. l d. 
had to drive to Lewiston in order to make purchases, at her 0Vv11 expense, necessary for 
functioning of the City. (Turner Aff., ,9.) 
Mrs. Tumer'semploymentwasterminatedinJanuary2011. (TumcrAff., 1)10.) At the· 
of her termination, Mrs. Turner was owed compensation for 84 hours of wages, 611 
vacation, and 898.25 hours of comp time. Id. The City had also failed to rcirn burse hrfrs. T:irncr 
expenses incurred on behalf of the City. Id. 
On January 20, 2011 Mrs. Turner submitted a check r~quest for thi;; ful1 ar,.:iormts mvcd 
upon the termination of her employment with the City. (Turner Aff., ~11, Ex. A,) The City 
Mrs. Turner for the 84 hours of wages, but failed to pay the rest of the amounts cnvcd to ivfrs. 
(Turner Aff., ~12, Ex. B.) On February I, 2011 MIS. Turner submitted a fo!knv up lct1cr to .. ,,_.,,. 
Ricky Hernandez regarding the amounts she was still owed. (Turn er Aff., ~13, Ex. C) 0 n 
28, 2011 Mrs. Turner submitted a follow up letter to City Councillor Antonio Sr:nith regarding 
amounts she was still owed. (Turner Aff., ~14,Ex. D.) On March 21, 2011 Mayor Hernandez v<rnk 
Mrs. Turner and informed her that the "City of Lapwai is currently rcvie'·"~ng your firm! 
reimbursement of comprehensive time and other reimbursable items." (Turner Alf, J["l 5, Ex. 
Mrs. Turner has never been paid for her accrued vacation a..11d comp time, nor have l\cr 
reimbursed by the City since leaving the City's employment. (Turner Aff., ~16.) 
. ill. APPLICABLE LEGAL STMllAP.D 
Summary judgment shall be granted «if the movant shows that there is no gcnuim:' 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." Fed. R. Civ. F. 
56(a). "The moving party is 'entitled to a judgment as amattcroflaw' because thc:nrnmwving :y 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SlHvfMARY 
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has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect 1 o 
has the burden of proof." Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "(A] pnrty :-:<'il' £''.:'' 
judgment always bears the initial responsibility of infomring the district court of the i<i; i;c, 
motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, a11swcrs to :ntc:rrogri.\,_.-n]c:;, :11'1: 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes dcmonstxa!c the a 
a genuine issue of material fact." Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
To withstand summary judgment, a non-moving party "must make a showing suffidcnt 11.1 
establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the existence of the es:::cntial clc111cnt0 ~.i[jil::J 
case that [it] must prove at trial." Galen y. Cty, of Los A11geles, 477 F.3d 652, 658 (20C7). 
Significantly, at the summary judgment state, a court must "draw all reasonable infrrercc~: 
of the non-moving party and, where disputed issues of material fact exist, assume the version of' the 
material facts asserted by the non-moving party to be correct." Aloe Vera of A mer ica, Jn c v. 
699F.3d1153, 1165 (2012). See also CarePartners, LLCv. Lashway, 545 F.Jd iJ67, 
2008) ("Regarding p+ossible factual disputes, we assume that the version of tlie rnatr:riJl 
asserted by the non-moving party ... is correct."). 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The City makes two arguments in support of its motion for summary judgrncnt. Ffr~;t, !'t'' 
City argues that Mrs. Turner failed to file with it a satisfactory notice of her tort claim. Second, t'y, 
City argues that Mrs. Turner's claims are time-barred. Bot.11 arguments fail and the City's 
should be denied. 
1. Mrs. Turner Presented a Sufficient Notice of Tart Cki.m wit/f the C~ty. 
The City first argues that Mrs. Turner failed to satisfy the notice .requirements of LC. !; 5 
219, a condition precedent to bringing a lawsuit against a municipal entity. lvirs. Turner 
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JUDGME1·rr - 4 51 
Jul 23 2013 3:27PM B CRAWFORD AND HOW 20 7077 
dispute that§ 50-219 required the filing of a tort claim notjce with the City_ The 
significantly overstates the formality required to satisfy§ 50-219. Idaho Code§ 6--90/ 3ct;:; 
requirements for a notice of a tort claim: 
All claims presented to and filed with a governmental entity shall accuraieJy 
conduct and circumstances which brought about the injmy or damage_. dcs<--~ribc the · 
damage, state the time and place the injury or damage occurred, state the munc:; 
persons involved, if known, and shall contain the amount of damages clairn cd, toge tlicr -w i ~ h 
a statement of the actual residence of the claimant at the time of presenting aad 
claim and for a period of six (6) months immediately prior to the tirnc the da7m 1:irc:;.r:. 
A claim filed under the provisions of this section shall not be held invalig_QF irnrnffo:i::;nU·:: 
reason of an inaccuracy in stating the time. place, nature or cause of UK: ~]_~1inLm: '~~·11-<;r~~j :;_::: .. 
unless it is shown that the governmental entity was in fac1 misled to its ird;I;.3::.__~b.:;;1~-:liy_ 
(emphasis added.) 
Mrs. Turner presented the City with notice sufficient to satisfy § 50-219 m1l\ § G-'.J07 on'' 
less than three occasions. First, Mrs. Turner submitted a check request to the City on 
2011. This check request included the full amounts of accrued vacation and corrip time; dT an· 1 
owing to Mrs. Turner. 
Secondly, on February 1, 2011 Mrs. Turner sent then-Mayor Ricky 1Icrnm1dc::, a l:: 
specifically outlining her claim for wages. The letter specifically requests Mn]. Turner's foJ.1 
check, as well as reimbursement for mileage from the second half of 20 l 1. 
Third, on February 28, 2011 :Mrs. Turner sent City CounciUor Antonio Srnith mi cr;mil 
an attached letter regarding her claim for accrued vacation and comp time and 
expenses. This letter provides great detail and heightened specificity regarding l\1rs. Turner· s cJ;; ini c, 
delineating them in a numerical format and providing the detaiis giving rise 10 the ck 
Councillor Smith replied in aclmowledgment to Mrs. Turner's letter to bir:l mJ. l\fard\ 
2011. On March 21, 2011 Mayor Hernandez acknowledged that the City 1.vas rcvicvvi;1g 
Turner's request for payment of accrued vacation and comp time and reimbursement 
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The City informed .Mrs. Turner that it was going so far as to retain an outside accounting t·; 
investigate the merits of Mrs. Turner's claims. The City thus cannot claim that it lacked knm',ckdg.t:-: 
regarding, or was misled as to the nature of, Mrs. Turner's claims. 
The City cites a single case, Brown v. City of Caldwell, 769 F. Supp. 2d 12.56 (D. 
2011), for the proposition that demand letters are inherently :insufficient to suti:~fy 
requirements of§ 50-219. (Defendant's~Memorandum in Support ofA1oticmforSunm1myJudg1 1w•;: 
("Dft's MSJ Memo"), at 3.) The City reads too much into Brown. In that case, the p'.;•inliJf 
that two demand letters he sent the City of Caldwell after being terminated ;:is fire chief ;nti:;Jicd 
notice requirements of§ ~0-2.J 9. Id. at 1262. The court ruled that the demand letters faikcl to satisfy 
§ 50-219 because the letters did not include the plaintiffs address, the amount or nnturc of · 
alleged damages, and the letters didnotputthe City of Caldwell on notice because tbcy ·were a>:>i sc:-t 
to or filed with the city clerk. Id. at 1263. 
All of the written demands sent by Mrs. Turner to the City cumulatively sahsfy § 50-2 l () 
do not suffer the infirmities noted in Brown. Mrs. Turner's fin.al paycbcck request on January 
2011 includes her address and the amount Mrs. Turner is O\Ved broken do\om by accn1cd , :.) 
time, comp time, and sick leave, with accompanying documentation. The foml paycheck 1T1;uc:~i. 1v:1~; 
sent directly to the City. 
Mrs. Turner's letter to Mayor Hernandez on February 1, 2011 reiterated her request 
final paycheck, and also provides details regarding her unreimbursed mileage expenses. Sind::.dy, 
Mrs. Turner's letter to Councillor Smith on February 28, 2011 is highly detailed, nrnldng a ~:red fie. 
request for vacation and comp time pay and unreimbursed mileage: "I 'Nould like t!J be; rein J hn •.;'.· [dj 
for my Mileage Request submitted in December ... I am making a request for payment c{ JP; 
vacation and comp-time pay. n 
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The City cannot in good faith argue that it was not on notice regarding J\irs. Turi1cr'.s ,. 
On March 21, 2011 Mayor Hernandez wrote Mrs. Turner and informed her L1mt lhe "City 
is currently reviewing your final request for reimbursement of comprehensive time 2nd 0H_: 1:r 
reimbursable items." 
Section 6-907 counsels liberality in determiningwhetherthe notice rcquireuKnls of§ 
have been satisfied, emphasizing that even if notice thereunder hns tedmic:;.l defki.cndcs, 
is nonetheless sufficient "unless it is shovvn that the governmental entity was in fa cl ;Li ·~J,-< 1 r , 
injuzy thereby." Mayor Hernandez's letter of March 21, 2011 undisputcdly dccn.01!'3infr..::; 
City had a firm grasp and un4erstanding of Ms. Turner's claims and was not mi:dcd. 
Idaho courts have consistently applied this "substance over form" analysis to tnrt 
The case of Smith v. City of Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 586 P.2d 1062 (1978), is funcLionully 
to the facts in this case. In Smith, the plaintiff's insurer sent the Ci1y of Prc::;ton ~1 kHcx 
subrogation claim against it based on an automobile accident suffered by the 11l<1intitI tli:it ,,,-,-:· 
allegedly caused by the City of Preston's failure to remove foliage obscming a slop sign. 
586 P.2d at 1065. The City of Preston's insurance canier responded to the letter, 
subrogation. Id. The plaintiff sued the City of Preston, which then argued that tbc 
plaintiff's insurer failed to satisfy the notice requirements of§ 50-219. Id. 
rejected the City of Preston's argument, citing the "form over substance" nature of§ 
Id. 
Although the contents of the letter of October 8 does not cmnply with alJ the rcqui1 ~;;1~:nJ'.,; 
enumerated ins 6-907, we believe the contents of the letter were ~.dequatc in 1i ght of the 
proviso of that section which states that "(a) claim ... shall not be held inv2lidor i11suff1cic1L 
by reason of an inaccuracy in stating the time, place, nature or cause of 1hc c.lnim, ,_,r 
othermse, unless it is shown that the governmental entity was in fact miskJ l<J its inj;11::1 
thereby." 
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Additionally, the Smith court noted that "['I]he reply by the city's insunmcc carrier 
that the ... letter was sufficient to notify the city that a claim against it was being pmsucd :u:;l 1.0 
apprise the city of sufficient facts for it to investigate the matter, detem1ine i!s mc:ri1s and " n 
defense." Id. The March 21, 2011 letter from Mayor Hernandez to rv'.lrs. Turner in this case S('.'.J\C;~ 
as analogous confirmation that the City of Lapwai was aware of all facet<; of Mrs. Turner's ;n 
a claim under the ITCA. ") . 
.Sinrilarly, inHuffv. Uhl, 103 Idaho 274, 647 P.2d 730 (1982), the pl;:iini.iffw0s i11 'n 
an automobile accident wherein he was struck by a vehicle owned and operated by the r. 
County Irrigation District. Id. at 275, 647 P.2d at 731. Four days after the accident, !he 
went to the irrigation district office, told the receptionist there he had been in an accident 
irrigation district truck, and left a copy of the estimate to repair his car. Id. "fl1c irrigation 
argued that the written estimate delivered to its office ;,·vas insufficient to sathly i; 1(; no 
requirements of§ 50-219 because it did not contain all the infonnation required by§ f-'J07. ., 
276, 647 P.2d at 732. The court rejected this argument, ruling that "aHhough the: 'Ntt\tcn ''::1~'.1·;1 · 
itself did not contain a statement of demand, M.I.D. was clearly apprised of the foe! 
being prosecuted against it, and the amounl thereof." Id. The comi. pointed lo the fnu •'. r, f'' 
irrigation district referred the matter to its insurance carrier, thereby evidencing !hat it un• 
the claim against it. Id. Again, the March21, 2011 letter from Mayor Hernandez to 1vLrs. Turner i:; 
this case served as analogous confirmation that the City ofLapv11ai 'Nas a.vvarc of n!l focr:ts un 
Turner's claim and was investigating the matter to determine its merits aud prepan:: <1 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORA1'1DUM IN OPPOSmON TO DEFENDANT'S MOTTON FOR SUfvUMHY 
JUDGMENT- 8 55 
Jul .23 2013 3:28PM B CRAWFORD AND HOW 20 
Mrs. Turner presented the City with notice sufficient to satisfy § 50-219 "' 
virtue of her final paycheck request, correspondence to Mayor Hernnndez ou Fcbrnmy 1, 20 l J,;: d 
correspondence to Councillor Smith on February 28, 2011. The correspondence fro::n :"<'' 
Hernandez to Mrs. Turner dated March 21, 2011 serves as undisputable confirmation 1hc 
of Lapwai was aware of all facets of Mrs. Turner's claim and vvas investieating the Jni:.Ucr 11' 
determine its merits and prepare a defense. The City's motion for SU111mar1 judgrncD~: on s 1'0:;;;<; 
should be denied. 
2. Mrs. Turner's Complaint is Timely Filed. 
states: 
. Next, the City argues that Mrs. Turner's claim is time-barred by LC.§ 45-614. Tb;tt 
Any person shall have the right to collect wages, penalties and l:i quidutcd danm gcs 
by any law or pursuant to a contract of employment, but any action thereon slwL1 h 1; f1 
either with the department or commenced in a court of competent jurisdiction v1it1dn t',VG 
years after the cause of action accrued, provided, however, that in the event s~thtry or v1,Jgc:,: 
have been paid to any employee and such employee claims additional salmy, v,•ngc;;, tic:' 
or liquidated damages, because of work done or services perfonm~d during bi~ cmpl0ym':u1 
for the pay period covered by said payment, any action therefor shaH be commenced · i" 
six (6) months from the accrual of the cause of action .... In the event rm ucli_m 5:: 
commenced as herein provided, any remedy on the cause of act; on shnJl bc.: 
The City argues that the six month limitations period applicable to clain1cd '-v;~gc:; '.lt~ 
to specific pay periods, rather than the general two year limitations period, governs this cc1sc 
in support Wood v. Kinetic Sys., Inc .• 766 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (D. Idaho 2011 ). Mrs. 
in this case, however, differs significantly from the claim in Wood which the court rnkd 
the six month limitations period of§ 45-614. In that case, the plaintiffs claims ":;pccificJiy 
to claims for additional salary or wages and accrued but unpaid vacation pay 
additional wages for identified pay periods for which Wood already recejved payment of :nh:~' ur 
wages." Id. at 1085. 
PLAINTIFF'S :tv.LEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFE1'"'DANT'S MOTION FOR SUMJvIARY 
JUDGMENT-9 
Jul .23 2013 3: 28PM SEY CRAWFORD AND HOW 
The Wood case, a federal district court case, is not binding precedent 
not been cjted by any Idaho state court. Furthermore, mtlike the Wood pbintiiI, Mrs. Tr:.i~ ~,· 
claimed accrued vacation leave and comp time are not claimed for 1dcnlificd, spccifa: ['DY pc[ - :,_ 
Mrs. Turner's vacation and compensatory time are necessarily untethered to any specific 
otherwise she would have simply been paid in cash, as part ofherregular pnychcck, for the: 
and compensatory time accrued during the pay period. The very point 
compensatory time arrangement with the Citywas to preclude that veryre:sult, i.e., Tvfr:;_ 
owed time and a half for each and every overtime hour worked during a given r!:ty 
Mrs. Turner• s claim is singular, not multiple and attrfbutal;ile 10 _spci..:ifi.c p;iy pcricds, 
did not accrue until she was terminated. To be consistent in its position that Iv1rs. Turner':; ·.·uc:n' 
and compensatory time is composed of multiple components that are each sttr:ibuLablc Lo ;l J'_: 
pay period, the City must necessarily take the position that 11rs. Turner faced numerous l i 
periods whilst still working for the City. Mrs. Turner began working for the City in May C'f 
If Mrs. Turner's vacation and compensatmy time is composed of multiple com ponc.rits 1bat ar '.~ c;.» h 
attributable to a specific pay period, Mrs. Turner was required to bring a claim for her \acn'.;,-:111 
compensatory time accrued during her first two weeks of employ1.nent in }-Iovcrabcr of 2\)06, ; .: 
she was still an employee of the City. The illogic becomes readily apparent as tbe Ci \y must 
that Mrs. Turner, while still a City employee, needed to bring a claim in Dece:mher 2006 
and compensatory time accrued six months prior in June 2006 and in J a.nnary ?..007 
compensatory time accrued in July 2006, and so on and so forth. This positien ;-':3 nsscrtcd ! k 
City would effectively legislate a six month expiry on all vacation time, rcgrn:dkss of r<n 
company's policy. For example. pursuant to the City's argument, a company could sirnp1y 
an employee's vacation time six. months after the pay period in which it ;,vas accruccl, ;;_nd the 
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employee would have no recourse because the employee's claim for the vncatiun : ' ' 
attributable to a specific pay period six months earlier and thus be time--bmrcd. 
The City's contrary position is also internally inconsjstent. Dcs1)jtc argu111g ·'·l~.-~· 
limitations period for claims attributable to specific pay period applies, tl1c City st:1lc::: 1b~1t ' 
Turner's claim, in the singular, for the entirety of her vacation and compcnsato1y ti:nc ec«. '"' ~ ::; 
January20, 2011, the last day ofher employment. (Dft's MSJMemo, at 6.) J'v1rn. Tm.:.1cr, l1 i!'Y'.·v:1_ 
did not accrue the entirety of her vacation and compensatory time solely in ~he bst ;H:ry 
to her termination. By arguing that the entirety of Mrs. Turner's singulm dnirn 
comp time accrued when Mrs. Turner's employm~ntwas terminated on Jan:uary 21, 20 l l, 
is admitting that Mrs. Turner's claim is singular, and not multi pk and aHribulubk: to 
periods. 
The City's argument was squarely rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in Sclwonoro· -v. 
Bonner Cty, 113 Idaho 916, 750 P .2d 95 (1988). In that case, a Bonner County deputy 
comp time for every hour worked over forty dming a given work 'veek. Id. nt 917, 7 5 0 F 
The Bonner County policy manual encouraged employees to use their comp time dwi.'H; 
periodinwhichitwas earned. Id. Upon termination, theplaintHfclaimed thatBmmcr ·~;· 
him for 1,893 hours of comp time totaling $16,506.96. Id. Bonner County f\sscrtcd tkd. 
plaintiffs claim was time-barred. Id. at 918, 750 P .2d at 97. The Court rcje\;i.f:d 
ruling that the plaintiff "could not have demanded payment for '<.oomp time' acc.1 
termination of employment with the County", uotwit11standing the foct that the 
manual encouraged employees to use their comp time during the pay pe1iod in wltidJ it wD:c c:c; ,';. 
Id. Significantly, the court did not look back, brealc up the plaintiff's com}J tiJ:ne clain b to 
claims that "\\rere each attributable to specific pay periods, and restrict the plaintiff hJ 
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comp time accrued during pay periods within tl1e last six months. 
necessary if the six-month limitations period governing wage claims a1tribuiu.bk to 
periods was applied. Instead,, the cowi treated the plaintiff's comp time claim a:s n singuim c''''"i 
and permitted the entirety of the claim to proceed. Id. 
Similarly, Gilbertv. Moore, 108 Idaho 165, 697 P.2d 1179 (1985), is directly GD rw[nL In 
that case the plaintiff, a school bus driver, accumu1ated251 hollrs of overtime. Let J 
at 1180. The plaintiff was not paid for the overtime during the pay pe1-iod in 'Nhicll it \:vr;::: 
and the plaintiff was subsequently promised paid compenSiltory tirn.c in order to 
the 251 hours of overtime. Id. . . lJP9U terrnini;i.tjon,. the plaintiff brought an action v1ns 
compensation for the overtime/compensatory time. Id. at 167, 697 P .2d at l lg 1. 
appealed, arguing that the claim was untimely pursuant to 45-614's six month Lim; 
applicable to claims for additional pay relating to a specific pay 1)eriod.1 Id. The Supreme '· i 
rejected this argument and affirmed the district court, stating that "[t]he district cot.El 
that the school district could have compensated Mr. Gilbert for his overtime work any tirr;c 
the term of his contract .... It was not until that contract expired ... that his cau::.e of aclic;n 
accrued, for it is only then that he knew that he would not be compensated for the i. mpc~i cl c 
Id. Significantly, the Supreme Court did not break the Gilbert plaintiff's c.luim into multjplc 
attributable to specific pay periods; it treated the clajm ns one single cfai.rn nccr;_:ing u;::,-,,, 
termination. Mrs. Turner, just like the plaintiff in Gilbert, reasonnbly assumed during. l'.1:: ctmn''~ 
her employment that she would be compensated for her accrued vacation. Icn v1.:: and c1}.'JJ r~c: ': :c1 \' - .-.· 
time upon cessation of her employment. Mrs. Turner had no Tea.son tC1 know that s;ic ';w: 
1Section 45-608 is referred to in Gilbert;§ 45-608 was later recodificd as§ 45-61,L 
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compensated therefor until after she was terminated, thus her singular clnim. did nut t'ccrc 
was terminated and the City failed to compensate her for her vacation and cornpensgtcry 
Furthermore, Idaho public policy also favors the application of § 115-014's 1.;•.·,: > ··;1 
limitations period. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that '\vhere two construct.inns of o .. ";to\' 1 [r: u :· 
limitation or a rule which impacts directly upon such a statute are possible, coi..ut: generally 
the construction which gives the longer period in which to prosecute the action." Jomes v. fhicl, l 1 
Idaho 708, 710, 727P.2d 1136, 1138 (1986).See also 3ASUTIIERLA.ND STt\T. CONST.§ 70. 
pp. 493-94 (4th ed. 1986); Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Honeywell, 639 P.2d 996 
(statutes oflimitationpre~cribing a relatively short period of time in which to cornmc:mcc au uctic 
are usually construed narrowly to give the party a fair opportunity to prcsc'.:it the dnim); 1 " 
Taurus Drilling Ltd .. 218 Mont. 201, 710 P.2d 33 (1985) (longest of two cc·nflicting '''c' ~:' 
limitation shall apply). 
As demonstrated above, Mrs. Turner's claim for vacation and comp time is sing;ul ar ie ; ':' 1: ,,, 
earned over the entirety of her employment with the City. Accordingly, the gcncrnl t\:vo-yc;•r 
limitations period of§ 45-614 applicable to wage claims that are not attributubk~ to a spccifi c P<'Y 
period governs Mrs. Turner's claims in this case. Mrs. Turner's clabn.s arr.; thirn timely '.m;l 
City's motion for summary judgment should be denied. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The City's motion for summary judgment should be denied because Ivfrs. 
sufficient notice of all her claims to the City, which the City in tum aclmo·wfodgcd. 1'!or ::T:c 
Turner's claims time-barred because the City en-oneously argues that rm :inco:r:rcct; ;.;[;, :"'• ·•· 
limitations period applies. Applying the correct two-year limitations period, Mrs. Tn.rner's r,\ni:11·~ 
are timely. 
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DATED this 23rd day of July. 2013. 
BRASSEY, CRA \VF ORD &; 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of Ju1y , 2013, 1 served a lrue 
of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S MEI\iORANDUl\lI IN OPPOSITICtN 
MOTIONFORSUM:MARYJlJDGMENT,uponeachofthcfo11owingimhvidu.1'b 
same to be delivered by the method and to the addresses indicated below: 
Bentley G. Stromberg 
Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
U.S. Mail, postilgc prcpn · 
Hand-Ddivcr~~d 
Overnight M.ail 
FacsiTnile (208) 7iVi-O'lSJ 
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John M. Howell, ISB No. 6234 
Matthew G. Gunn, ISB No. 8763 
BRAS SEY, CRAWFORD & HOWELL, PLLC 
203 W. Main Street 
P.O. Box 1009 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009 
Telephone: (208) 344-7300 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND .JlJDICU.l, 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 
MERCEDES TURNER; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF LAPWAI; and DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: SS. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
Case No. CV J 2-025in 
AFFIDAVTI' OF ;_-,,__.,_,_.."'-'"''' 
IN SUPPORT Oli' 
JMEMORA:r-.fDlJn1l lN 
DEFENDAr~T'S 
SU1\1MARY J"vvG.M11:f:J'f 
MERCEDES TURNER, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and s1nt1,•s l\~; 
1. I am over the age of eighteen years, I am competent to rmuc.e tl li~> 
so based upon my own personal knowledge and belief. 
2. I was hired by the City of Lapwai (the "City") to serve as t}y~ City' 2 
treasurer in May of2006. 
3. I was also compensated for duties performed for the City's w;:>Jc~, sc,ver, :nt'i 
street departments. 
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4. I agreed with the City Council and David Fazzio, then the City's mayor, 
would be paid an annual salary on the basis of a thirty-five hour work week, \Vifo hidnys o . 
5. In addition to my annual salary, Mayor Fazzjo and the City Couuci l D.'_'i. 
worked in excess of my required thirty-five hours during a given. work week. Jvfy c011;p 
would be paid at the rate of my hourly salary up to 40 hours, and at a rate of 1.5 times 
salary for over 40 hours. My comp time would be paid upon my temrination or dcpr:trUYT 
employment with the City. 
6. .At :the time. tllls agreement was made, the City was suffc:ring a budgciu.ry 
and Mr. Fazzio and I agreed that comp time, in lieu of overtime pay, \vould benefit the" 
fiscally because the City would not have to pay me for all my overtime during eacll pny 
7. I was a diligent worker, often working long hours, nights, and v1cckrrnh 1--: \•_; 
the demands placed on me by virtue of the understaffed and disorganized state of !he City's 
municipal government. 
8. The City had no methodology by which the petty expcns:::s ::iltcmlm1i tc'; 
operation were to be paid. I regularly paid for such petty expenses v,;ith my pcrs011al n1oi:;:;y, :i; d 
often distributed my personal money to other City employees in order to aJ.knv ibcm to 
the City's petty expenses. 
9. I often had to drive to Lewiston in order to make purchs.ses, at my o\vn 2:>{prnsc, 
necessary for the basic functioning of the City. 
10. My employment was terminated in January 2011. At the time: of my Lcr.'nin:i\ion, 
I was qwed compensation for 84 hours of wages, 611 hours of vacation, and 8118..25 J.io1.1r8 ::~f 
comp time. The City had also failed to reimburse me for expenses incurred on behalf of foe 
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11. On January 20, 2011 I submitted a check request for the foll arrlounL-; 
upon the termination of my employment with the City. A true and correct copy of my f'in1·1 
request is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
12. The City paid me for the 84 hours of wages, but failed to pay ik re~:\ ;· 
amounts owed to me. A true and correct copy of the final check issued to me i:; sl 
as Exhibit B. 
13. On February 1, 2011 I submitted a follow up letter to lvfoyor Ricky U·:::rna11c)c.:, 
regarding the amounts I was still owed. A true and cOLTect copy of this correspo11denc0 i~; 
. aful.cbed hereto. as Exhibit C. 
14. On February 28, 2011 I submitted a follow up letter to City Courn;jlio;: ·_; 
Smith regarding the amormts I was still owed. A true and correct copy of this 
attached hereto as Exhibit D. 
15. On March 21, 2011 Mayor Hernandez VvTote me and informed me: that the,. : " 
of Lapwai is currently reviewing your final request for reimbursement of 
and other reimbursable items." A true and correct copy of this corresponckncc i;; uttc:clr:~d >~: ··' · 
as Ex:hibit E. 
16. I have never been paid for my accrued vacation and comp time, r:or 
expenses been reimbursed by the City since leaving the Cit-y's employrnenL 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT. 
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DATED tbi~.l. day of July. 2013. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J;j_ d.ay of July, 201 '.1, 
OFFU:l!!.1. SEAL 
FRANCISCO MARQUEZ 
NOTART PUBLIC • OREGON 
COMMISSION NO. 461258 
"'COHf!tmon EXl'IP.ES AUG~T 24. ms 
!JUUJDCA'.IE OF 5ERYiCt 
J HERBBV CERTIFY that on trusU~a.y o:f. July, 20 ll, 1 !!!;?;fVii'Cl a true &,u,d coni~ct, ry:1r.i::' tif 
the foregQiug AFFIDA. VIT OF MERCEDES 'fUIRNEJl, IN §UPPO<Rl' OF 
MEMORANDUM JN Ol'POSmON TO DEFENDANT'S ri'iO'ITON W{)l"R-
JUDGMENT, upon oaoh of tho following individuals by causing th.e samCJ toc bG 
method and to the adci~sses indicated below: 
Bentley G. Stromberg 
Cle\uents, Brown & McNichols. P.A. 
321 13th Strei~t 
P.O. &x J.510 
Lewi.stt)n, lduho 33501 
U.S. Mail, por;.t~'ge 
Bimd-Dt:li vered 
Ov~n.ii$ht M~U 
FMl:'itriil!! (208) 74 (},,Q753 
APFlDAVrt OF MERCEDES TURNER tN SUPPORT OF PLAlNTle'F'S MEMO.RA 'NOUM IN OPl'OS11JQN TO 
DBFENDA.'NT"S MOTlO'.N fOR SUMMA.RY JUOOMCNT. 4 
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---~------EARNINGS _____________ _ 
1/20/2011 
~---~-~DEDUCTIONS.~~~~~~ 
________ PERIOD __ _ 
_TITLE_ _HOURS __ RATE_ _AMOUlff_ 
Regular 
Overtlmi:> 
Yac;i!i<in . 
Sid<; Lsav-u 
Hc:Jfd<rt 
Cail0~1t 
Cornpllnw 
11-l.llO 
.co 
611.CO 
.00 
,r,Q 
1CO 
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.32.0040 
4o.OS80 
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32.C641J 
~2 .. CC.,iQ 
Si~ C~...40 
'.l:2.iJ3.d0 
TOT.r~L S~i7.N~J·1GS 
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;,~;:;;~·· ::'A'( 
2,693.38 
.00 
19,691.10 
,00 
. OI~ 
.GD 
_ .. ~]~~·i.:~--
511GJ-0.97 
18)974.7"! .. 
;; ~ ,11 ·L2~ 
__YEAR_ TO_DATE __ 
_liOURS ___ AMOUNT_ 
133.75 4,446.B/3 
,C'O ,DO 
611.00 19,591.10 
U5 40,C;'J 
24.C'l.l 
.00 
C'98.25 
769.54 
.W 
28, S-Oi ,49 
-~,6.51.09 
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Jul 23 2013 3:32PM CRAWFORD AND HOW 20- 47077 
F ~ t '. 1 ' ' -
To: Kim From: l\llercedes-
Fax: 208-746-3616 Pages: 7 
rl \.0 
'.,~~ t"'i Phone: 208-746-3611 !t_; \.0 ("!.'-;. m 
t{_"w • 
-, U) Re: Mercedes Cash o·ut ........ ~ CC: 
:;o. ....... 
~:; I 
r.,~i 00 Reason: Please Review 0 CJ N c. 
c .. 
... x Priority~ Urgent .,:,._ •"C C.i-. i L. 
Kim, 
This ls what I have for My last check. Please review the Vacation and i:omp 1irf\r; ,,;,.-,, 
anything else you see. 
Please let me know if you need anything elsel 
~ '!Tufut..c:JJ.. 
City derk/Treasurer 
City of Lapwai 
315 S. Main Street 
P.O. Box 336 
lapwala; ID 83540 
T-208.843.22.12 
F-2.08.843.5613 
AFFIDAVIT OF MERCEDES TURNER IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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have been given to respond to the allegations, have been unable to locate any ordinance or City 
Council action establishing such an 'employment relationship. Regardless, as you know, even 
where the employment is "at-will", the employer cannot exercise its right. to discharge or talce 
disciplinary action against an employee in Idaho, ''when the motivation for doing so violates or 
contravenes public policy." See MacNeil v. Minidoka Memorial Hospital, 108 Idahd 5&8. 701 · 
P.2d208 (1985).InRayv. NampaSchoolDist.No.131, 120Idaho 117, 814P.2d 17 (1991), the 
Idaho Supreme Court specifically recognized that a former maintenance electrician with the 
School District could pursue a claim fox: wrongful tennination against the School District, 
whetherornottheernploymentwas"at-will''ifthemotivationforterminatingtheemployeewas 
retaliation for reporting safety violations by the School District Id. at 120 Idaho 121. 
In addressing the alleged grounds for disciplinary action asserted within the 
Amended Notice against Mr. Brown, we offer the following responses in chronological order: 
1. August 29, 2008. On that date, Mr: Brown received a performance 
evaluation by you pursuant to the provisions of the Caldwell City Personnel Policy Manual. 
Interestingly, in the Amended Notice, you refer to the evaluation only for your reference within 
the evaluation that Mr. Brown "needs to work on a positive and supportive attitude.'' No 
indication is provided within the evaluation of the basis for such an opinio~ nor was one given 
to Mr. Brown at the time. Further, .to accomplish your goal of terminating Mr. Brown's 
employment, within the Amended Notice, you ignore the fact that you identified within the 
evaluation that Mr. Brown's work performance "exceeds expectations" in almost all categories 
and the comments within the evaluation that Mr. Brown "insures that the tasks/projects are 
completed in a timely and professional manner" and that he "completes assignments in a timely 
manner and welcomes the opportunity to improve" and that he "performs his job to the best of 
his abilities." Mr. Brown does not know or understand the specific incidents referredto by you 
within the evaluation and we hereby request copies and specific reference to any emails or other 
information submitted by :Mr. Brown prior to the evaluation that you assert were not "positive 
and supportive." Incidentally. despite the requirement to the contrary within the Caldwell City 
Personnel Manual, no evaluation of any kind was provided to Mr. Brown for the year 2009. M:r. 
Brown specifically asserts that he always endeavored to be positive and supportive when 
appropriate, but further that his duties and responsibilities as Fire Marshal responsible for the 
safety of the public at large did not al·ways allow him to do so. 
2. · September 18~ 2008. On that date a meeting was held with Mr. Bro'W!l 
where he was reprimanded fur an email sent by hlm on September 16, 2008 wherein he described 
a perceived fire safety issue at 214 S. 7'>h Ave. and requested further information relating to the 
issue. Mr. Brown was reprimanded for not exercising "good, sound judgment" and encouraged 
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to meet with people "one-on-one" rather than preserving written evidence of the expression of 
his concerns. I have read the September 16, 2008 email and although you may not have 
appreciated the substance of the concerns raised, nothing within the email appears to have been 
unfounded, unprofessional or "derogatory" in any way. If ignoring or failing to document 
perceived safety concerns by a Fire Marshal in your mind constitute "good, sound judgment'', I 
think most rational minds would strongly disagree with you. 
3. March 13, 2009. On that date, Mr. Brown received written notice 
concerning an email that he had drafted on March 13, 2009. Within the email, Mr. Brown 
provides credit to licensees for their cooperation during inspections, but he expresses concern 
over how the matters were handled in the past and cautions that the City protect improved 
procedures and ensure that it not "backslide'' into past unsafe practices. You shockingly 
reprimanded Mr. Brown for expressing his concerns and for including within the email any 
information that you did not perceive to be positive or supportive. Further, you deleted from his 
email the concerns expressed. Your apparent and continued concern with the content of Mr. 
Brown's emails appears to be the fact that such emails are public record and available to the 
public upon request. Without question. disciplining a Fire Marshal for documenting perceived 
safety concerns merely because they may constitute a public record is abhorrent Taking steps to 
alter the perceived safety concerns exceeds any measure of conscionability. 
4. August3, 2009. Mr.BrownreceivedaFinalNoticeorDisciplinaryNotice 
demanding that Mr. Brown refrain from adding his "personal opinion" and "derogatory 
language" within email communication. I have reviewed all ofMr. Brown's correspondence that 
you assert as a basis for the disciplinary action and I see nothing "derogatory." Apparently, your 
definition of derogatory includes well-intended, good faith observations of a Fire Marshal that 
may be critical in nature. Expecting a Fire Marshal to only identify and document positive 
aspects of safety protection is not only reprehensible but dangerous. Further, because certain 
elements of the responsibilities of a Fire Marshal are subjective in nature and dependent upon the 
perception of the Fire Marshal, the expression of professional opinion is a necessary component 
of the job. The responsibilities for public safety inherent within such a position do not allow a 
Fire Marshal to avoid the formation and expression of professional opinion in many situations. 
The Disciplinary Notice specifically referenced two situations involving Iv.fr. Brown on July 26 
and July 28, 2009, respectively. 
The July 26, 2009 memorandum addresses fire safety issues relating to the former 
· Van Buren Elementary School. Your Notice asserted that Mr. Brown included "unfounded 
conclusions" and "derogatory language." Specifically, you took issue with MI. Brown's 
assessment of the .intended users of the facility in determining whether there was an intended 
SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF COUNSEL 
CALDWELL 331 
qo 
Case 1:10-cv-OL~..;6-BLW Document 4-8 Filed 11/011..1..u Page 11 of 33 
Page4 
11/13/2009 
"significant change in use" of the building as an alternative high school rather than an elementary 
·school. Nothing st.ated within the memorandum was "derogatory'' or "disparaging" toward 
anyone. Rather, Mr. Brown addressed the obvious and perceived differences in use of the 
structure from a fire safety standpoint raised by elementary students as opposed to alternative 
high school students. As unpopular as Mr. Brown's assessment may have been with the intended 
administrators of the school) as you should very well lmow, a Fire Marshall should not feel 
restrained in any way from expressing good faith concerns regarding the safety of a structure for 
a particular intended use. 
On July 28, 2009, you reference within your Disciplinazy Notice that you and Mr. 
Bro'Wll met with staff from the school who apparently "took offense" to the conclusions set forth 
within the July 26, 2009 memo. You assert that MI. Brown should have provided a "genuine 
apology" to the administration and staff for the substance ofhis memorandum. I simply fail to 
understand how a good faith analysis of the differences in use and safety of the structure based 
upon the general characteristics of the intended users of the siructure (undoubtedly supported by 
numerous studies, statistics and, frankly, common sense) constitutes "derogatory'' content or 
conduct warranting an apology. You received a copy of the memorandum prior to it being 
submitted and it was not until you perceived the reaction ofthe staff and administration that you 
criticiZed Mr. Brown on its content. Once again, oftentimes the opinions and/or conclusions of a 
Fire Marshal are unpopular with the o'Wllers or users of the subject structure. Expecting your 
Fire Marshal to "walk on egg-shells" in the performance of his responsibilities for fear of 
offending others is simply unreasonable and dangerous policy. In drafting the memorandum, Mr. 
Bro'Wll did nothing other than hls job and your persistent use of disciplinary measures to suppress 
the expression of fire safety concerns is not only reprehensible, but also illegal under the laws of 
this state. 
Neither your Disciplinary Notice nor your Amended Notice identify what 
conclusions within the memorandum you perceived to have been "unfounded" I welcome 
further information from you in that regard While you may disagree with some of the opinions, 
conclusions or statements set forth therein, that does not conclusively establish that they were 
"unfounded'' or, in any way, asserted in bad faith. 
Within your Disciplinary Notice but noticeably absent from your Amended 
Notice, you reference a memorandum submitted by MI. Brown on March 3, 2009 wherein he 
was critical of the fire safety cooperation and history of a particular developer. It must be noted 
that the substance of the concerns expressed regarding the particular developer were justified and 
well-intended. A simple review of the memorandum reveals that none of the statements are 
unprofessional or "derogatory'' in any way. Nonetheless, M:r. Brown apologiz.ed to the developer 
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to the extent that the developer took issue with the tone of the memorandum and nothing further 
was discussed. The uncooperative and unprepared tendencies of the particular developer were 
draining upon the time and attention of the Fire Marshal and inspee:tors and resulted in wasted 
public resources. Documenting this type of activity to assist in dealing with future issues with 
the developer was not only responsible but appropriate given the circumstances presented to Mr. 
Bro'WIL. 
5. October 30, 2009. On that date, :Mr. Brown left a voice message for 
Dennis Wilson in which he referenced that Adele Adams was getting "gnarli' about the need for 
inspections of priority construction projects by the fire department and that the department 
should try to accommodate her requests because Mr. Brown did not want ro "hurt her feelings." 
Nothing 'Within this voice-mail is unprofessional or inappropriate at all. FurU1er, the frustration -
expressed was well-justified under the circumstances. 
The message left on Dennis Wilson's voicemail was intended for Dennis' ears 
only. It is unknown exactly how, or why, that message got played for Adele Adams to hear. It is 
suspected that Wilson was disgruntled at Fire Marshal Brown for not hiring him as the Fire 
Prevention Officer around June 2009. 
The message left for Dennis Wilson contained no profanity or anything truly 
derogatory, did not defame Adele, and only criticized the fact that Adele Was being critical of the 
fire department for not being available on Fridays, when the Fire Prevention offices are 
"supposed'' to be closed. 
Dennis Wilson's near daily casual conservations with Fire Marshal Brown never 
revealed that Nfr. Wilson was upset enough over not getting hired as the FPO that he would pass 
on a message like that to Adele. This appears to be an act of overt retaliation against Fire 
Marshal Brown. The Fire Marshal and other members of the Fire Department, city employees 
and construction industry have had numerous and multiple issues with Adele· Adams. These 
have been reported to the Fire Chief on multiple occasions by Mr. Brown. WithlnAdams' first 
month of employment she had irritated so many people with her attitude - city employees and 
construction industry trades people-that a special meeting had to be called to attempt to restore 
order. 
Adams has displayed a -negative attitude toward the Fire Marshal and the fire 
department since she started her job with Caldwell. According to her co-worker, Dennis Wilson, 
she regularly badmouths the Fire Marshal and Fire Prevention Officer (both Karine Aebi and 
Melinda Allgood) within the Building Department and in the field. (The reason why the 
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construction trades people have not filed more complaints against Adele isfor fear ofreprisal-
they "need'~ her to timely schedule and approve their construction work as building inspector.) 
There are builders who car+ substantiate problems they have had with Adele that would be 
willing to do so, if asked. 
In addressing your actions in suspending 11!-. Brown with the intention of 
terrnina.ting11!-. Brown's employment. I expect that Mr. Bro-wn'scriticismregardingfiresafety 
issues relating to structures owned by the City of Caldwell and the Caldwell Urban Renewal 
Agency are involved. 
• Missing from the record is an incident involving a series of emails written on 
Januazy 9, 2009 regarding the buildings at 215 S. Kimball (:in file.) There is 
an email from Fire Marshal Brown (1-9-09 at 9:09 AM) to several City staff 
that is factual and accurate to the extent of his knowledge. It asks a question 
requesting information that the Fire Marshal had "overheard" that the building 
had been "condemned". As it turns out, the building is not city-owned but is 
O"Wiled by the Urban Renewal Agency. The accuracy of this is essentially 
irrelevant to the discussion. The point is a "public" agency owns th~ building, 
all the more reason to ensure the building has no unknmvn issues with it. 
Again, the Fire Marshal was soliciting factual :information, not making 
unfounded accusations. Agron> the Fire Marshal was seeking to protect the 
public who would be using the building and the building O"Wiler (a public 
agency) from possible liability ofleasing out a possibly unsafe building. 
In an email string written on January 9, 2009, City employee Dennis Cannon 
(who is involved in leasing these buildings) wrote to Finance Director Eilay 
Waite regarding the Fire Marshal's comments: "Here he goes again. Doug 
chose to make negative remarks that aren't totally correct, rather than get on 
with bis work." This is a reference back to the Can Act Theater problem a few 
months earlier that Mr. Cannon was involved in allowing to happen. The nex:t 
email in that string is from EIJay Waite to the Fire Marshal stating: "I am 
ashamed of your conduct." This is extremely derogatozyto the Fire Marshal 
and was brought to the attention of the Fire Chief - with no action taken. 
• :Missing from the record is a situation around July 2009 of a city-owned 
aircraft hangar at Caldwell Airport. This building has had ongoing building 
and fire code problems. When the Airport Manager tried to re-lease the 
building as a changed use, it had to come before a city review (Roundtable 
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Session) due to the Mayor's January 8, 2009 policy (in file). This revealed 
that the old building could not be used due to code violations. It-did not even 
have a certificate of occupancy for it as required in the Building Code. 
However, the new policy advocated by the Fire Marshal to Anne Marie 
Skinner who passed it on to the Mayor, meant there was now an appropriate 
method in which to process changes in use for public-owned buildings. This 
effectively removed the Fire Marshal from the position of dealing with such 
issues "after the fact'' by memo or email. 
It clearly appears that your actions in suspending, with the intention of terminating 
MI. Brown's employment with the City, are motivated not by any misconduct of the employee. 
Rather, your actions are offered in an effort to suppress his documentation and expression of 
legitimate issues and concerns regarding the fire safety of certain buildings occupied by the 
public. Such action constitutes a violation of the public policy of this state and must be 
immediately corrected. I hereby request that MI. Brown be immediately reinstated and that his 
personnel file be appropriately expunged of such violations. If you choose to carry out the 
termination of MI. Bro'W!l's employment, the matter will be~ appealed pursuant to the City's 
Grievance Procedures and, if necessary, legal action will be filed 1.mder the laws of the State of 
Idaho. I sincerely hope that does not become necessary. 
Eric S. Rossman 
c: Douglas Brown 
W~Wad.'\9\!lrc .... ~d•,;D11llllO!.dm 
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ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC 
November 25, 2009 
Via Facsimile Transmission & Regular Mail 
Mark Wendelsdorf 
City of Caldwell 
City Hall 
41.1 Blaine Street 
Post Office Box 1179 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
Monica Jones 
City of Caldwell 
City Hall 
411 Blaine Street 
Post Office.Box 1179 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
Re: Douglas Brown 
Dear M:r. Wendelsdorf and Ms. Jones: 
Lisa Reinke~ P~ralcg;J .. lrdnkr@ret~manlaw com 
J:is:on C;;rroH. P.u·.aJeg:il • jrenoH@t"ounu1nhw.com 
I write as legal counsel for Doug Brown. On or about November 18, 2009~ 
Caldwell Fire Chie4 Mark Wendelsdorf served a NOTICE OF DECISION REGARDING 
PENDING PERSONNEL ACTION-TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT upon Ivfr. Brown. 
Please consider this letter Mr. Brown's written grievance pursuant to Section VIIl(B)(l) of the 
City of Caldwell Personnel Manual. 
On or about November 10, 2009, Caldwell Fire Chief: Mark W endelsdor±: served 
a NOTICE OF PROPOSED DISCIPLINARY ACTION upon Mr. Bro'WD. and sent him home on 
paid suspension. The Notice identified five alleged grounds for the disciplinary action and 
directed Mr. Brown to respond to the Notice on or before 3:00 pm on November 13, 2009. On 
November 11, 2009, lv.f.r. Brown received a second NOTICE OF PROPOSED DISCIPLINARY 
ACTION which adjusted, for some unknown reason, the order of grounds asserted against him 
and providing additional or different information relating to the allegations. However, the 
second Notice was back-dated to November 10, 2009 and no additional three-day period was 
afforded to lv.f:r. Brown to respond to the new or changed allegations being asserted against him. 
The City of Caldwell Personnel Policy Manu~ Rev. May 1, 2006, §VIII (A), specifically states Q s 
that, "[a] supervisor who has cause to believe that disciplinary action may be necessary shall I · 
. _. ----- ----.---.-.-:-:-:-:-.:-:-:-:-:-~-:-: - -~ -_-, -::::-:.::-:-:-.::-:::::.::-.::-:-:-:->·-- -----~ ;-.-:-:~:-.:-:-:-::-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-.:.-:-:-:-:·:·Y .. 
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make a reasonable effort to ascertain all relevant facts prior to proposing or taking disciplinary 
action." It seems rational and reasonable that a supervisor would want to afford an employee a 
sufficient period of time to respond to allegations being asserte4 against him/her when such 
supervisor is exb.a,usting his/her reasonable effort to ascertain all relevant facts before carrying 
out a termination of a long-term employee's employment. I do not believe that serving a back-
dated Notice asserting new or different allegations and giving the employee less than two days to 
respond constitutes a "reasonable effort", but, nonetheless, I will provide a summary response on 
behalf ofJY.!r. Brown below. 
I fully understand that the City of Caldwell may assert that JY.!r. Brown is 
employed by the City on an at-will basis. I, however, in the short period of time during which I 
have been given to respond to the allegations, have been unable to locate any ordinance or City 
Council action establishing such an employment relationship. Regardless, as you lmow, even 
where the employment is "at-will", the employer cannot exercise its right to discharge or take 
disciplinary action against an employee in Idaho, "when the motivation for doing so violates or 
contravenes public policy." See MacNeil v. Minidoka Memorial Hospital, 108 Idaho 588, 701 
P.2d 208 (1985). InRayv. Nampa School Dist No. 131, 120 Idaho 117, 814 P.2d 17 (1991), the 
Idaho Supreme Court specifically recognized th.at a former maintenance electrician with the 
School District could pursue a claim for wrongful termination against the School District, 
whether or not the employment was "at-will" if the motivation for terminating the employee was 
retaliation for reporting safety violations by the School District. Id. at 120 Idaho 121. 
In addressing the alleged grounds for disciplinary action asserted within the 
.Amended Notice against Mr. Brown. we offer the following responses in chronological order: 
1. August 29, 2008. On that date, Mr. Brown received a performance 
evaluation by Mr. Wendelsdorf pursuant to the provisions of the Caldwell City Personnel Policy 
Manual Interestingly, in the Amended Notice, Mr. W endelsdorf referred to the evaluation only 
for his reference within :the evaluation that Mr. Brown "needs to work on a positive and 
supportive attitude." No indication was provided within the evaluation of the. basis for such an 
opinion, nor was one given to Mr. Brown a:t the time. Further, to accomplish Mr. Wendelsdorfs 
goal of tenninating Mr. Brown's employment, within the Amended Notice, Mr. Wendelsdorf 
ignored the fact that he identified within the evaluation that :Mr. Brown's work performance 
"exceeds expectations" in almost all categories and the com.."llents within the evaluation that:Mr. 
Brown "insures that the tasks/projects are completed .in a timely and professional manner" and 
that he "completes assignments in a timely manner and welcomes the opportunity to improve" 
and that he "performs his job to the best of bis abilities." :Mr. Brown does not know or 
understand the specific incidents referred to by JY.!r. Wendelsdorf within the evaluation and we 
hereby request copies and specific reference to any emails or other information submitted by :Mr. 
Brown prior to the evaluation that JY.!r. Wendelsdorf asserted were not "positive and supportive." 
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Incidentally, despite the requirement to the contrazy within the Caldwell City Personnel Manual, 
no evaluation of any lcind was provided to Mr. Brown for the year 2009. Mr. Brovm specifically 
asserts that he always end~avored to be positive and supportive when appropriate, but fiJrther 
that his duties and responsibilities as Fire Marshal responsible for the safety of the public at large 
did not always allow him to do so. 
2. September 18, 2008. On that date a meeting was held with Mr. Brown 
where he was reprimanded for an email sent by him on September 16, 2008 wherein he described 
a perceived fire safety issue at 214 S. th Ave. and requested further information relating to the 
issue. Mr. Brown was reprimanded for not exercising "good, sound judgment'' and encouraged 
to meet with people "one-on-one" rather than preserving written evidence of the expression of 
his concerns. I have read the September 16, 2008 email and although Mr. Wendelsdorf may not 
have appreciated the substance of the concerns raised, nothing within the email appears to have 
been unfounded, unprofessional or "derogatory" in any way. If ignoring or failing to document 
perceived safety concerns by a Fire Marshal in Mr. Wendelsdorfs mind constituted "good. 
sound judgment", I think most rational minds would strongly disagree with him. 
3. March 13, 2009. On that date, J\fr. Brown received written notice 
concerning an email that he had drafted on March 13, 2009. Within the email, J\fr. Brown 
provides credit to licensees for their cooperation during inspections, but he expresses concern 
over how the matters were handled in the past and cautions that the City protect improved 
procedures and en.sure that it not "backslide'' into past unsafe practices. Mr. Wendelsdorf 
shockingly reprimanded :M:r. Brown for expressing his concerns and for including within the 
email any infonnation that he did not perceive to be positive or supportive. Further, M:r. 
Wendelsdorf deleted from his email the concerns expressed. Mr. W endelsdor:P s apparent and 
continued concern with the content of:MI. Brown's emails appears to be the fact that such emails 
are public record and available to the public upon request Without question, disciplining a Fire 
Marshal for documenting perceived safety concerns merely because they may constitute a public 
record is abhorrent. Taking steps to alter the perceived safety concerns exceeds any measure of 
conscionability. 
4. August 3, 2009. Mr. BrownreceivedaFinalNotice or Disciplinary Notice 
demanding that J\fr. Brown refrain from adding his "personal opinion'' and "derogatory 
language" within email communication. I have reviewed all ofMr. Brown's correspondence that 
you assert as a basis for the disciplinary action and I see nothing "derogatory." Apparently, Mr. 
Wendelsdorf' s definition of derogatory includes well-intended. good faith observations of a Fire 
Marshal that may be critical in nature. Expecting a Fire Marshal to only identify and document 
positive aspects of safety protection is not only reprehensible but dangerous. Further, because 
certain elements of the responsibilities of a Fire Marshal are subjective in nature and dependent 
upon the perception of the Fire Marshal, the expression of professional opinion is a necessary 
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component of the job. The responsibilities for public safety inherent within such a position do 
. not allow a Fire Marshal to avoid the formation and expression of professional opinion in many 
situations. The Disciplinary Notice specifically referenced two situations involving Iv.fr. Brown 
on July 26 and July 28, 2009, respectively. 
The July 26, 2009 memorandum addresses fire safety issues relating to the fonner 
Van Buren Elementary School. Iv.fr. Wendelsdorfs Notice asserted that.Ml". Bro'W!l included 
"unfounded conclusions" and "derogatory language.n Specifically, Mr. Wendelsdorf took issue 
'With MI. Brown's assessment of the intended users of the facility in determining whether there 
was an intended "significant change in use'' of the building as an alternative high school rather 
than an elementary school. Nothing stated 'Within the memorandum was "derogatozy" or 
"disparaging"' toward anyone. Rather, :Mr. Brown addressed the obvious and perceived 
differences in use of the structure from a fire safety standpoint raised by elementary students as 
opposed to alternative high school students. As unpopular as Mr. Brown• s assessment may have 
been with the .intended administrators of the school, as .Mr. W endelsdorf should very well know, 
a Fire Marshall should not feel restrained in any way from expressing good faith concerns 
regarding the safety of a structure for a particular intended use. 
On July 28, 2009, .Mr. Wendelsdorf referenced 'Within the Disciplinary Notice '!hat 
he and Mr. Brown met with st.aff from the school who apparently "took offense" to the 
conclusions set forth within the July 26, 2009 memo . .Mr. Wendelsdorf asserted that :Mr. Brown 
should have provided a "genuine apology" to the administration and staff for the substance of his 
memorandum. I simply fail to understand how a good faith analysis of the differences .in use and 
safety of the structure based upon the general characteristics of the intended users of the structure 
(undoubtedly supported by numerous studies, statistics and, frankly, common sense) constitutes 
"derogatory" content or conduct warranting an apology. Mr. Wendelsdorf received a copy of the 
memorandum prior to it being submitted and it was not until he perceived the reaction of the staff 
and administration that he criticized .Iv.fr. Brown on its content. Once again, oftentimes the 
opinions and/or conclusions of a Fire Marshal are unpopular with the owners or users of the 
subject structure. Expecting your Fire Marshal to ''walk on egg-shells" in the performance of his 
responsibilities for fear of offending others is simply unreasonable and dangerous policy. In 
drafting the memorandum, M:r. Brown did nothing other than his job and .M:r. Wendelsdorf s 
persistent use of disciplinary measures to suppress the expression of fire safety concerns is not 
only reprehensible, but also illegal under the laws of this state. 
Neither the Disciplinary Notice nor the Amended Notice identify what conclusions 
within the memorandum :Mr. Wendelsdorfperceived to have been "unfounded." I welcome 
:further information from .M:r. Wendelsdorfin that regard. W1rile l\tf:r. Wendelsdorf may disagree 
with some of the opinions, conclusions or statements set forth therein, that does not conclusively 
establish that they were "unfounded" or, in any.way, asserted in bad faith. 
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With.in the Disciplinary Notice but noticeably absent from the Amended Notice, 
lv.fr. W endelsdorf referenced a memorandum submitted by :Mj:. Brown on March 3, 2009 wherein 
he was critical of the fire safety' cooperation and history of a particular developer. It must be 
noted that the substance of the concerns expressed regarding the particular developer were 
justified and well-intended. A simple review of the memorandum reveals that none of the 
statements are unprofessional or "derogatory" in any way. Nonetheless, Ivfr. Brown apologized 
to the developer to the extent that the developer took issue with the tone of the memorandum and 
nothing further was discussed. The uncooperative and unprepared tendencies of the particular 
developer were draining upon the time and attention of the Fire Marshal and inspectors and 
resulted in wasted public resources. Documenting this type of activity to assist in dealing with 
future issues with the developer was not only responsible but appropriate given the 
circumstances presented to lv.fr. Brown. 
5. October 30, 2009. On that date, J\1r. Brown left a voice message for 
Dennis Wilson in which he referenced that Adele Adams was getting ''giiarly" about the need for 
inspections of priority construction projects by the fire department and that the department 
should try to accommodate her requests because Mr. Brown did not want to "hurt her feelings." 
Nothing within this voice-mail is unprofessional or inappropriate at alL Further, the frustration 
expressed was well-justified under the circumst.ances. 
The message left on Dennis Wilson's voicemail was intended for Dennis' ears 
only. It is unknown exactly how, or why, that message got played for Adele Adams to hear. It is 
suspected that Wilson was disgruntled at Fire Marshal Brown for not hiring him as the Fire 
Prevention Officer around June 2009. 
The message left for Dennis Wilson contained no _profanity or anything truly 
derogatory, did not defame Adele, and only criticized the fact that Adele was being critical of the 
fire department for not being available on Fridays, when the ·Fire Prevention offices are 
"supposed" to be closed. 
Dennis Wilson's near daily casual conservations with Fire Marshal Brown never 
revealed that lv.fr. Wilson was upset enough over not getting hired as the FPO that he would pass 
on a message like that to Adele. This appears to be an act of overt retaliation against Fire 
Marshal Brown. The Fire :Marshal and other members of the Fire Department, city employees 
and construction industry have had numerous and multiple issues with Adele Adams. These 
have been reported to the Fire Chief on multiple occasions by :Mr. Brown. With.in Adams' first 
month. of employment she had irritated so many people with her attitude - city employees and 
construction industry trades people- that a special meeting had to be called to attempt to restore 
order. 
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Adams has displayed a negative attitude toward the Fire Marshal and the fire 
department since she started her job with Caldwell According to her co-worker, Dennis Wilson, 
she regularly badmouths the Fire Marshal and Fire Prevention Officer (both Karine Aebi and 
Melinda Allgood) within the Building Department and in the field. (The reason why the 
construction trades people have not filed more complaints against Adele i.s for fear of reprisal-
they "need" her to timely schedule and approve theiY construction work as building inspector.) 
There are builders who can substantiate problems they have had with Adele that would be 
willing to do so, if asked. 
In addressing Mr. Wendelsdor:fs actions in suspending Mr. Brown with the 
intention of tenninating Mr. Brown's employment, I expect that Mr. Brown's criticism regarding 
fire safety issues relating to structures owned by the City of Caldwell and the Caldwell Urban 
Renewal Agency are involved. 
• Wssing from the record is an incident involving a series of emails vvritten on 
January 9, 2009 regarding the buildings at 215 S. Kimball (in file.) There is 
an email from Fire Marshal Brown (1-9-09 at 9:09AM) to several City staff 
that is factual and accurate to the extent of bis knowledge. It asks a question 
requesting information that the Ffre Marshal had "overheard" that the building 
had been "condemned". As it turns out, the building is not city-owned but is 
owned by the Urban Renewal Agency. The accuracy of this is essentially 
irrelevant to the discussion. The point is a "public" agency owns the building, 
all the more reason to ensure the building has no unknown issues with it. 
Again, the Fire Marshal was soliciting factual information, not making 
unfounded accusations. Again, the Fire Marshal was seeking to protect the 
public who would be using the building and the building owner (a public 
agency) from possible liability ofleasing out a possibly unsafe building. 
In an email string-written on January 9, 2009, City employee Dennis Cannon 
(who is involved in leasing these buildings) wrote to Finance Director ElJay 
Waite regarding the Fire :Marshal's comments: "Here he goes again. Doug 
chose to make negative remarks that aren't totally correct, rather than get on 
with his work.'' This is a reference back to the Can Act Theater problem a few 
months earlier t.tiatMr. Cannon was involved in allowing to happen. The next 
email in that string is from ElJ ay Waite to the Fire Marsha! stating: "I am 
ashamed of your conduct.'' This is extremely derogatory to the Fire Marshal 
and was brought to the attention of the Fire Chief - with no action taken. 
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• Missing from the record is a situation around July 2009 of a city-o\V!led 
aircraft hangar at Caldwell Airport. This building has had ongoing building 
and fire code problems. When the Airport Manager tried to re-lease the 
building as a changed use, it had to come before a city review (Roundtable 
Session) due to the Mayor's January 8, 2009 policy (in file). This revealed 
that the old building could not be used due to code violations. It did not even 
have a certificate of occupancy for it as required in the Building Code. 
However, the new policy advocated by the Fire Marshal to Anne Marie 
Skinner who passed it on to the Mayor, meant there was now an appropriate 
method in which to process changes in use for public-owned buildings. This 
effectively removed the Fire Marshal from the position of dealing with such 
issues "after the fact" by memo or email. 
It clearly appears that Mr. Wendelsdorf s actions in suspending, with the intention 
of terminating .Mr. Brown's employment with the City, vyere motivated not by any misconduct of 
the employee. Rather, Mr. Wendelsdorf's actions were offered in an effort to suppress his 
documentation and expression of legitimate issues and concerns regarding the fire safety of 
certain buildings occupied by the public. Such action constitutes a violation of the public policy 
of this st.ate andmust be immediately corrected. I hereby request that Mr. Brown be immediately 
reinstated and tb.a:t his personnel file be appropriately expunged of such violations 
Sincerely, 
~ 
Eric S. Rossman 
c: Douglas Bro"W!l 
\1.'ll~W.-k\ll1.B:uM. Omjl\C.W""1ll~! l,•<»m. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
MERCEDES TURNER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF LAPWAI, an Idaho municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-2587 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY 
Plaintiff Mercedes Turner ("Turner") asserts two distinct claims in this case: one 
for wages, and one for unreimbursed expenses. Turner's wage claim must be dismissed 
if Defendant City of Lapwai ("City") is correct either that Turner failed timely to file a 
sufficient notice of claim detailing her wage claim or that her cause of action was subject 
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to a six-month statute of limitations. Turner's expense reimbursement claim must be 
dismissed if the City is correct that Turner failed timely to file a sufficient notice of claim 
detailing her reimbursement claim. 
Summary judgment is warranted on both grounds. However, the Court may 
choose to dismiss the wage claim solely based upon the applicable statute of limitations 
because, as shown below, Turner makes no viable argument against the applicability of a 
six-month limitations period. Turner's entire argument conflates accrual (or accumula-
tion) of wages over the course of employment with accrual of a cause of action upon 
termination of employment. And no party can appeal to policy or statutory ambiguity by 
simply contorting a straightforward statute and body of case law into pseudo-ambiguous 
law. 
The Court may then choose to analyze the sufficiency of Turner's informal 
"requests" for expense reimbursement without delving into the same analysis for her 
wage claim. Turner's expense reimbursement claim is barred because of two facts that 
are not saved by the principal Supreme Court cases Turner relies upon. First, none of her 
requests was presented to the City Clerk, the only person to whom a claim can validly be 
presented. As discussed below, in each of Turner's nvo cases, the Supreme Court made a 
point of noting the claim was presented to the official required by the relevant statutes -
not, as here, a private outside auditor, the 11ayor, or one of five City Councilors. Turner 
has provided no evidence that the City Clerk received any of her requests. Second, none 
of Turner's requests noted the amount of her 2010 expenses, even though they were 
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obviously liquidated by early 2011. Indeed, the Court can scour the pleadings, briefs, 
affidavits, and exhibits and it will not find - still, over two and a half years after 
Turner's termination - a simple statement of the amount the City owed her for unreim-
bursed expenses. 1 Even if these facts did not distinguish Turner's two cases, the Supreme 
Court's application and limitation of those cases over the past three decades drains them 
of any relevant vitality. 
For these reasons, both of Turner's claims should be dismissed. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Turner's entire statute of limitations argument is incorrect because, from begin-
ning to end, it conflates accrual (or accumulation) of wages over the course of employ-
ment with accrual of a cause of action upon termination of employment. Turner's cause 
of action for additional pay is subject to a six-month statute of limitations because, as her 
own affidavit admits, her alleged comp time was payable for hours she allegedly worked 
"during each pay period." (Turner Aff. , 6; see also id. , 5 (alleged comp time was 
earned for excess hours worked "during a given work week").) These two admissions 
reveal the first full paragraph on page 10 of Turner's opposition brief as exactly 
backwards. Turner's ensuing argument only compounds the confusion. 
1 Turner did not provide the amount in her first or second set of discovery responses to 
the City. Not until after the City filed its summary judgment motion and sent a second 
request did Turner provide the City the amount of her expense reimbursement claim by 
her third set of discovery responses. 
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The parties all agree that Turner's cause of action accrued on her last day of 
employment, January 20, 2011, when she had a legal entitlement to be paid any wages 
that allegedly had accumulated in each pay period over the course of her employment but 
that allegedly were not payable in cash until her termination. But, as reflected on her pay 
stubs and twice acknowledged in her own affidavit, Turner accumulated her alleged 
wages in discrete, calculable amounts in each pay period over the course of her employ-
ment. See Idaho Code § 45-614 (referring to "pay period[s]"). There is no genuine 
dispute that her cause of action - even for alleged wages accumulated years before -
accrued upon her January 20, 2011 termination. There is no genuine dispute that Turner 
seeks additional compensation that accumulated in pay periods for which she already 
received paychecks. Given these facts, Turner's cause of action lapsed six months after 
her termination, or on July 20, 2011. Her claim is thus untimely. 
Several cases confirm that accrual of the cause of action is a separate inquiry from 
which statute of limitations applies. For example, a Ninth Circuit panel had to clarify 
confusion similar to Turner's in its unpublished opinion in Leher v. Western States 
Equipment Co., 908 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1990): "Although Leher may not have been 
entitled to the commission until April or May of 1987 ... this does not affect the 
applicable statute oflimitations, but rather, the date of the accrual of the action." Id. The 
Court in Ca/lenders, Inc. v. Bechnan, 814 P.2d 429 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991), summarized 
the two distinct concepts applicable in this case perfectly: 
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[An] action to collect ... wages must be commenced within six months 
after the cause of action accrues if the claim is for wages additional to those 
already paid. I.C. § 45---614. A cause of action for the collection of wages 
accrues when an employee has a right to collect the wages that are allegedly 
owed to him. 
Id. at 433-34. 
Turner cites two cases that do nothing more than confirm what the City stated in 
its opening brief: that Turner's cause of action accrued upon her termination. The 
governments in both cases Turner cites claimed that the employee's actual cause of 
action (not just his wages) accrued at the end of each pay period and not upon termination 
of his employment. In Gilbert v. Moore, 697 P.2d 1179 (Idaho 1985), the plaintiff filed 
suit two weeks after his termination. Id. at 1180-81. As the Gilbert Court noted, "The 
crucial issue is determining when Mr. Gilbert's cause of action accrued." Id. at 1181. 
Because Gilbert's cause of action did not accrue until he was terminated, i.e., two weeks 
before Gilbert filed suit, the Court did not even address which statute of limitations 
applied. See id at 1181-82. Similarly, in Schoonover v. Bonner County, 750 P.2d 95 
(Idaho 1988), the plaintiff had accumulated overtime that was payable upon his 
termination. Id. at 98. He filed suit to recover his accumulated overtime "within one 
month of [his] termination." Id at 97. Neither case illuminates Turner's case, because in 
neither case did the plaintiff wait more than six months to file his lawsuit. The cases 
simply support a point on which all parties agree. 
Turner appeals to public policy. No liberality of construction or public policy 
remotely approves a claimant like Turner - fully apprised of all facts necessary to her 
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claim - to send several requests for payment of wages and then sit on her claim for 
another 18 months. Public policy counsels against a liberal reading of the statute of 
limitations here, not for it. Regardless, as the cases demonstrate, there is no relevant 
ambiguity in the statute that leaves room for application of a tvvo-year limitations period. 
Turner does not grapple with the several Idaho cases cited in the City's opening 
brief or genuinely dispute the City's analysis. Wood v. Kinetic Systems, Inc., 766 F. 
Supp. 2d 1080, 1085-86 (D. Idaho 2011), is directly on point with Turner's case and 
consistent with state court case law. Ultimately, Turner's own testimony in opposition -
as with her Complaint's request for "remain[ing]" wages (see Compl. ~ 16) - pleads her 
squarely into the six-month statute of limitations made applicable by Idaho Code § 45-
614. Her wage claim is barred because she filed it well more than six months past 
January 20, 2011. 
B. FAILURE TO FILE NOTICE OF CLAIM 
The notice of claim issue is perhaps more nuanced but still fatal to Turner's 
claims. Turner asserts that three requests "cumulatively satisfy" the statutory require-
ments of sufficient notice of her two claims. (Pl. 's Memo. in Opp 'n to Def 's Mot. for 
Surnm. J. ("Opp'n Memo."), at 6.) Turner must so argue because it is undisputed she 
never "presented to and filed with the clerk" of the City, William Big Man, any document 
whatsoever. (See Idaho Code§ 6-906; Big Man Aff. iii! 3, 5.) 
First, in support of her wage claim only, she asserts she faxed a "check request" on 
January 20, 2011 showing the details of her wage request. (Turner Aff. if 11.) Turner 
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twice inaccurately asserts that this fax "was sent directly to the City." (Opp'n Memo., at 
6.; see also id. at 5 ("Mrs. Turner submitted a check request to the City on January 20, 
2011.") As the Court will see from the fax cover (showing both a recipient fax and 
telephone prefix of "7 46"), the wage request was sent from Turner's office on Turner's 
City letterhead to a person named "Kim," an employee of the City's private auditing firm, 
Jergens & Co., in Lewiston, Idaho. (See Turner Aff., Ex. A.) (Turner references "Kim 
[and] Brian from Jergens audit[ing her] payroll records" in her letter to Councilor Smith. 
(See Turner Aff., Ex. D, at, 4(d).)) There is no genuine dispute that the wage request 
was not sent to the City, much less to the City Clerk's office. In addition, the fax was 
sent on January 20, 2011, on Turner's last day of work. It could no more have served the 
purpose of a "claim[] for damages," § 50-219 (emphasis added), than could an 
employee's timesheet handed to his supervisor for signature. Turner offers no evidence 
sufficient for purposes of surviving summary judgment that this fax was ever shared with 
anyone at the City, much less its City Clerk. The cases discussed below demonstrate that 
the fax to the outside auditor is entitled to no weight, taken cumulatively or otherwise. 
Second, in support of both her wage and expense reimbursement claims, Turner 
asserts she mailed a letter dated February 1, 2011 to Mayor Hernandez. (See Turner Aff., 
Ex. C.) The letter does not "specifically outlin[e] her claim for wages." (Opp'n Memo., 
at 5.) The letter is about retrieving her personal property and asks vaguely about her final 
paycheck. There is not a scintilla of useful information about the paycheck's amount, the 
elements constituting it, justification for (or even a description of any alleged agreement 
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supporting) its outlandish amount - nothing. Turner simply provides instructions for 
deductions. She vaguely mentions a mileage check without noting its amount or the 
circumstances behind the accrual of mileage. She asks for January 2011 mileage to be 
calculated for her based on the City's bank records, instead of (as one might expect) her 
own mileage records. She provides no evidence that the letter was actually sent by her or 
received by the Mayor, much less received by the City Clerk. 
Third, Turner provides one half of an email exchange with a single member of the 
five-member City Council. (See Turner Aff., Ex. D.) This letter certainly provides more 
explanation, but nowhere provides the amount she seeks either in expense reimbursement 
or wages. The letter provides lots of irrelevant information but still does not explain the 
justification or agreement upon which she bases her claim to be paid 1,500 hours of comp 
time and vacation on top of her salary. (The Court will notice that Turner's requests, like 
the record, are bare of any Council meeting minutes or other Council-approved 
agreement supporting Turner's alleged comp time and vacation arrangement.) She only 
requests mileage reimbursement and not other expenses. She requests payment of 
vacation and comp time pay, but not sick leave pay. Again, she provides no evidence 
that this email or letter was relayed to the City Clerk. 
Turner mentions, but does not provide the Court with, Councilor Smith's reply 
email dated March 2, 2011. (See Opp'n J\1emo., at 5.) Turner provided the City the reply 
email in discovery in this case, and a copy is attached. (See Supp. Deel. of Counsel, Ex. 
A.) Councilor Smith actually advises Turner to take her mileage and payroll requests 
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(i.e., for all items except her request for payment of her legal bills) to "the office," 
meaning the City Clerk's office: 
I can check on #3, but I think the other request on this letter would be better 
served by the office. They have access to Cassel [payroll system] and files 
that you are making reference to. The City has had temporary people 
filling positions, although very competent, they are still getting a feel for 
where things are and how things flow. This information may assist them in 
their efforts to respond to your request. 
(Id.) Smith does not offer to relay the message or letter to fellow City Council members, 
the Mayor, or the City Clerk - and Turner offers no evidence that he did. Rather, 
Turner was effectively placed on notice that she needed to take her mileage and payroll 
claims to the City Clerk. She never did. 
Lastly, Turner asserts that she received a letter from Mayor Ricky Hernandez 
advising her that the City would notify her after it reviews her request with an outside 
accounting service. (See Turner Aff, Ex. E.) But not even this letter makes clear exactly 
what Turner requested or what amounts were at issue: the letter references comp time, 
but not vacation or sick leave (cf Opp'n Memo., at 5 (asserting the letter acknowledged 
Turner's request for "accrued vacation")); and it mentions "other reimbursable items," 
but does not indicate that the City knew what items or amounts were subject to 
reimbursement. The letter does not reference a request (much less a claim) filed on a 
given date with anyone. As the cases discussed below illustrate, the City's actual notice 
of Turner's request does not relieve Turner of the requirement to provide the City Clerk 
(and nobody else) notice that she intended to further pursue her request for wages and 
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expenses by a claim for legal damages. She could have presented and filed such a claim 
to the City Clerk after Mayor Hernandez sent this letter to her and (presumably) failed to 
reply 30 days later. (See Turner Aff, Ex. E.) She never did. 
Instead, as plaintiffs have done unsuccessfully for decades, Turner relies upon 
Smith v. City of Preston, 586 P.2d 1062 (Idaho 1978), and Huff v. Uhl, 647 P.2d 730 
(Idaho 1982), for the proposition that this series of communications fulfilled the purposes 
(but not the requirements) ofldaho Code§§ 50-219, 6-906, 6-907, and 6-908. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has gone out of its way, however, to distinguish and limit the reach of 
these two cases in the 35 years since Smith and the 31 years since Huff, repeatedly reject-
ing a simple inquiry into whether the purposes of the statutes were met and whether the 
governmental entity was, per§ 6-907, "misled to its injury." See, e.g., Blass v. County of 
Twin Falls, 974 P.2d 503, 504-05 (Idaho 1999) (rejecting a plaintiff's reliance on Smith 
even where county-owned hospital admitted it would not have conducted any different 
investigation had a sufficient claim been filed); Avila v. Wahlquist, 890 P.2d 331, 334 
(Idaho 1995) (distinguishing Huff and holding notice insufficient even where the State 
was on actual notice of claim within one week of accident, conducted a full investigation, 
and was not prejudiced by the insufficient notice); Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 887 
P.2d 29, 32 (Idaho 1994) (distinguishing Smith and Huff and holding that written notice 
to City's insurer and oral statements to City representative were insufficient); Stevens v. 
Fleming, 777 P.2d 1196, 1204 (Idaho 1989) (distinguishing Smith and Huff and holding 
that letter apprising City of insurance claim made directly by plaintiffs was insufficient 
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because letter to City was not sent by plaintiffs themselves). The Idaho Supreme Court 
does not simply ask whether the government had knowledge of some of the circum-
stances surrounding a claim and was prejudiced by the failure to file a notice of claim 
with the proper official. 
Smith and Hu.ff are as easily distinguished here because, in each case, notice (in 
whatever form) was provided directly to "the clerk or secretary of the political subdivi-
sion" as required by § 6-906. In Smith, the plaintiffs complaint averred (and evidence 
demonstrated) that the plaintiffs letter was sent to the City Clerk. See Smith, 586 P.2d at 
1063. In Huff, the Court made a point to note that the secretary of the irrigation district 
had personally received notice of the claim in the plaintiffs presence. See Huff, 647 P.2d 
at 731, 732-33. And since deciding Smith and Huff, the Court has not relented on that 
statutory requirement. In both Avila, 890 P.2d at 334, and Friel, 887 P.2d at 31, the 
Court rejected the Court of Appeals' holding in Sysco Intermountain Food Service v. City 
of Twin Falls, 705 P.2d 548 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985), that notice to a City's insurer could 
substitute for notice to the officer designated in § 6-906. See also Blass, 974 P.2d at 505 
(notice to insurance adjuster and forwarded to proper official at hospital still not 
sufficient). Smith, Huff, Friel, Avila, and Blass are all consistent: notice to any person 
other than (in this case) the City Clerk is simply not notice at all, and so inquiries about 
prejudice, inaccuracy, substantial compliance, or otherwise are irrelevant. Cf Stevens v. 
Fleming, 777 P.2d 1196, 1204 (Idaho 1989) ("Since the City had no actual notice, 
whether or not it was misled to its injury by failure to provide formal notice is 
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irrelevant."). Neither Turner's Complaint nor opposition papers even attempt to demon-
strate that she presented and filed any kind of request, much less a notice of claim, to the 
City Clerk. 
In addition, Turner cannot show this Court anywhere in the record - including 
her own Complaint, filed nearly two years after she incurred the subject expenses - the 
amount she requested for reimbursable expenses. But this amount, at least for 2010, was 
obviously already liquidated by the time she made any of her requests. As the title of 
§ 6-907 plainly indicates, the last sentence of § 6-907 excuses only "inaccuracies" in 
notices of claims, not outright omissions. See § 6-907 (titled "Contents of claims--Filing 
by agent or attomey--Effect of inaccuracies" (emphasis added)). The omission of dollar 
amounts in either of her requests to Mayor Hernandez and Councilor Smith (if the 
requests had even sufficed as notices) is not an "inaccuracy" saved by § 6-907 or Huff or 
Smith. Cf Huff, 647 P.2d at 732 (noting amount presented to secretary); Smith, 586 P.2d 
at 1065 (noting amount not yet liquidated). Indeed, reviewing the litany of decisions 
limiting Smith and Huff cited above, one may fairly argue that the Supreme Court has 
backed away from any reading of those cases that stretches the last sentence of§ 6-907 
beyond its terms by forgiving material omissions that are more than mere "inaccuracies." 
The Legislature created a bizarrely specific statutory scheme if the entire judicial inquiry 
was simply intended to be, "Was the governmental entity misled to its injury?" That is 
not the law in Idaho. 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO 
C'TThKU A RV nmGMENT 
-12- l I 3 
This background demonstrates that Judge Winmill faithfully applied Idaho law in 
the recent case cited in the City's opening brief and downplayed by Turner. In Brown v. 
City of Caldwell, 769 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (D. Idaho 2011), Judge Winmill held that 
"demand letters" do not constitute notice of a "claim[] for damages" under§ 50-219. See 
Brown, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 1258-59, 1263. The demand letters in Brown were extensive. 
(See Supp. Deel. of Counsel, Ex. B (copies of relevant demand letters from Brown's 
Pacer record).) It is hard to imagine the City of Caldwell arguing that it was not apprised 
of Brown's demands. But the Supreme Court has twice noted that notices of claim are 
intended to place the governmental entity on formal notice that an aggrieved person 
"intended to go a step farther by bringing a tort claim." Pounds v. Denison, 816 P.2d 
982, 984 (Idaho 1991); accord Avila, 890 P.2d at 334 (quoting this passage from Pounds 
and holding notice insufficient where it did not state amount of claim or provide notice 
that plaintiff ''was pursuing a tort claim"). In light of the Supreme Court's application of 
Smith and Huff in recent decades, both Judge Winmill and the City are on solid footing to 
argue that demand letters (like Turner's requests) are insufficient to put a City on notice 
that a merely aggrieved person intends to become a plaintiff. 
In this case, once Turner's requests to the Mayor and a single City Councilor were 
unsatisfied, Turner had an obligation to put the City Clerk (at the exclusion of the rest of 
the world) on notice that she asserted a wage claim under title 45 of the Idaho Code and a 
breach of contract claim for expense reimbursements. Such a notice of claim, to be 
complete, should have apprised the City of the amounts of her claims and the circumstan-
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ces or agreements that might possibly have justified her claim to damages for payment of 
1,500 hours of comp time and vacation far exceeding all limits made applicable by City 
policy, enforced in annual audits by the City's auditors, and disregarded by Turner. 
Not even Turner's requests do this, cumulatively or otherwise. Turner is thus 
incorrect to argue her requests to the Mayor and City Councilor "do not suffer the 
infirmities noted in Brown," because hers suffer all three Brown infirmities Turner lists. 
(See Opp'n Memo., at 6.) Her requests omit the "amount of damages claimed," the 
relevant "conduct and circumstances" underlying her damages, see Idaho Code § 6-907, 
and were never "presented to and filed with the [City] [C]lerk," see § 6-906. These are 
not inaccuracies, but material omissions. Smith and Huff do not cure them. 
Turner's claims should be dismissed for failure to comply with the requirements of 
Idaho Code §§ 50-219, 6-906, 6-907, and 6-908 as those requirements have been 
consistently applied by the Supreme Court for the past three decades. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the City should be granted summary judgment on all of 
Turner's claims against it. 
DATED this 30th day of July, 2013. 1.·~f ~.,.~··· Mk /. .· 1?/f ~~1 :A i1l~l!!Jf! p. cHoLs, P.A. 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
) 
MERCEDES TURNER, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
CITY OF LAPWAI, fill Idaho municipal ) 
corporation, ) 
) 
Defendfillt. ) 
CASE NO. CV-2012-2587 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JU1)GMENT 
This matter came before the Court on the Defendfillt's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The Plaintiff was represented by John Howell filld Matthew Gunn, of the firm 
Brassey, Crawford & Howell. The Defendfillt was represented by Bentley Stromberg filld 
Joshua McKarcher, of the firm Clements, Brown & McNichols. The Court heard oral 
argument on August 6, 2013. The Court, having heard the argument of counsel filld being 
fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision. 
BACKGROffi\11> 
In May of2006, Turner was hired by the City of Lapwai to serve primarily as the 
City treasurer filld clerk. Complaint, at 2. Turner was paid fill annual salary, based on a 
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thirty-five hour work week, with Fridays off. In addition to the annual salary, Turner 
would also accrue compensatory time and five weeks of vacation time annually. Id. at 2-
3. Turner's employment with the City terminated on January 20, 2011. On February 3, 
2011, the City paid Turner her last paycheck, which included 84 hours of wages due and 
owing. Complaint, at 4; Affidavit of William Big Man, at 2, Turner asserts that at the 
time of termination she was owed compensation for 84 hours of wages, 611 hours of 
vacation and 898.25 hours of comp time. Complaint, at 3. 
Turner filed the foregoing action seeking to recover amounts due for vacation and 
comp time, as well as monies due for the City's failure to reimburse Turner for travel and 
( 
other expenses. Currently pending before this Court is the City's motion for summary 
judgment. 
SUMMARY JUDG1\1ENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment should be granted where there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 
56(c). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court must construe 
the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits in a light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. Ruffing v. Ada County Paramedics, 145 Idaho 943, 945, 188 P.3d 885, 
887 (2008); Conway v. Sonntag, 141 Idaho 144, 146, 106 P.3d 470, 472 (2005), citing 
In/anger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 44 P.3d 1100 (2002). 
'When a motion for summary judgment is "supported by a particularized affidavit, 
the opposing party may not rest upon bare allegations or denials in his pleadings," but 
must set forth "specific facts" shO\ving a genuine issue. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Verbillis v. 
Dependable Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335, 337, 689 P.2d 227, 229 (Ct. App. 1984). A 
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"mere scintilla" of evidence or only a "slight doubt" as to the facts is insufficient to 
withstand summary judgment. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896, 155 P.3d 695, 697 
(2007); see also Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 238, 108 P.3d 380, 385 
r 
(2005). 
Finally, the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact is on the moving party, and once this burden is met, it is incumbent upon the 
non-moving party to establish an issue of fact regarding that element. Meikle v. Watson, 
138 Idaho 680, 683, 69 P.3d 100, 103 (2003); Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 
Idaho 171, 923 P.2d 416 (1996). 
ANALYSIS 
The City is seeking summary dismissal of Turner's claims for unpaid wages and 
unreimbursed expenses. The City asserts these claims must be dismissed because Turner 
failed to file a statutorily-required notice of claim for damages with the City clerk. 
Further, the City asserts the wage claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.1 
1. Whether Turner failed to file a notice of claim for damages. 
Any person filing a damages claim against a city must file a notice of claim with 
the city clerk within one hundred eighty days from the date the claim arose. 
Idaho Code § 50-219 provides, "All claims for damages against a city 
must be filed as prescribed by chapter 9, title 6, Idaho Code." "Section 6-
906 of the Tort Claims Act provides that claims against a city must be 
presented to and filed V\i.th the city clerk within 180 days from the date the 
claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is 
later." Bryant v. City of Blackfoot, 137 Idaho 307, 311, 48 P.3d 636, 640 
(2002). 
1 As set forth below, Turner failed to file a notice of tort claim with the City within the prescribed time r 
frame as required by the ITCA. Thus, it is not necessary for this Court to determine whether the wage 
claims would be barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
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Scott Beckstead Real Estate Co. v. City of Preston, 147 Idaho 852, 854, 216 P.3d 141, 
142 - 143 (2009). LC. § 6-907 sets forth the requirements for a notice of a tort claim. 
All claims presented to and filed \Vith a governmental entity shall 
accurately describe the conduct and circumstances which brought about 
the injury or damage, describe the injury or damage, state the time and 
place the injury or damage occurred, state the names of all persons 
involved, if known, and shall contain the amount of damages claimed, 
together with a statement of the actual residence of the claimant at the 
time of presenting and filing the claim and for a period of six ( 6) months 
immediately prior to the time the claim arose. If the claimant is 
incapacitated from presenting and filing his claim within the time 
prescribed or if the claimant is a minor or if the claimant is a nonresident 
of the state and is absent during the time within which his claim is 
required to be filed, the claim may be presented and filed on behalf of the 
claimant by any relative, attorney or agent representing the claimant. A 
claim filed under the provisions of this section shall not be held invalid or 
insufficient by reason of an inaccuracy in stating the time, place, nature or 
cause of the claim, or otherwise, unless it is shown that the governmental 
entity was in fact misled to its injury thereby. 
LC. § 6-907. The City avers that no notice of tort claim was filed with the city clerk in 
this matter. Affidavit of William Big Man, at 2. Turner asserts that she presented the City 
\Vith sufficient notice because she submitted a check request and two letters which 
sufficiently put the City on notice that she was seeking full amounts of accrued vacation 
and comp time due and o\ving. First, Turner submitted a check request to the City on t 
January 29, 2011. Affidavit of Mercedes Turner, Exhibit A. This check request is made 
in the form of a letter faxed to an individual named Kim, and labeled Mercedes Cash Out. 
Within the body of the text there is a statement asking Kim to review the vacation and 
comp time calculations. Id. 
On February 1, 2011, Turner sent a letter to the City Mayor. Affidavit of 
Mercedes Turner, Exhibit B. Within this letter Turner stated she had not received her 
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final paycheck from the City, nor did she receive reimbursement for mileage for the third .. 
i 
and fourth quarter of 2011. Turner also referenced a public records request. There is 
nothing in this letter which addresses vacation or comp time requests. Shortly after this 
letter was sent, Turner received her final paycheck from the City. Affidavit of Mercedes 
Turner, Exhibit B. 
On February 28, 2011, Turner sent an email with an attached letter to City 
Councilor Antonio Smith. Affidavit of.Mercedes Turner, Exhibit D. This letter provided 
more detail regarding Turner's request for mileage reimbursement, a request for 
reimbursement of legal bills, and finally, a request for payment of vacation and comp 
time pay. Turner did not set forth the specific amount she was requesting, but she speaks 
in detail regarding her payroll records, and suggested the City contact Kim or Brian from ... 
I 
Jurgens. Jurgens appears to be the accounting firm the City retained for auditing records. 
Councilor Smith did respond to Turner's letter, directing her to contact "the office" in 
reference to the City Clerk's office. Supplemental Declaration of Counsel, Exhibit A. 
Thus, the issue before this Court is whether the contacts Turner made with the 
Mayor and a City Councilor substantially complied with the notice requirements ofI.C. § 
6-907. The purpose of the notice requirement is discussed in Mitchell v. Bingham 
Memorial Hosp., 130 Idaho 420, 942 P.2d 544 (1997). 
A "written demand" is plainly required by the statute. LC. § 6-902(7). 
As this Court has previously held, the purpose of the notice requirement is 
to"(l) save needless expense and litigation by providing an opportunity for 
amicable resolution of the differences between parties, (2) allow 
authorities to conduct a full investigation into the cause of the injury in r 
order to determine the extent of the state's liability, if any, and (3) allow 
the state to prepare defenses." Pounds v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425, 426-27, 
816 P.2d 982, 983-84 (1991) (quoting Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398, 
401, 630 P.2d 685, 688 (1981)). Compare Hujf v. Uhl, 103 Idaho 274, 
276, 647 P.2d 730, 732 (1982) (Although not expressly a "written 
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demand" pursuant to LC. § 6-902(7), a ·written estimate of damages was 
held to provide sufficient notice of a tort claim because it contained 
enough information to alert the governmental agency that a claim was 
being prosecuted against it). 
Id. at 424-425, 942 P.2d at 548-549. 
The City relies on a District ofidaho case, Brown v. City of Caldwell, 769 
F.Supp.2d, 1256 (D. Idaho 2011), in support of the argument that notice was not 
provided. In Brown, demand letters were sent to the Fire Chief and Human Resources 
Director. The Brown Court found that the demand letters were not sufficient to meet the 
applicable notice requirements of LC. § 6-907. 
Here, there is no factual dispute about what the demand letters say. Thus, 
the only question is purely legal: whether Bro~n's demand letters meet the 
applicable notice requirements. The Court finds they do not. Under Idaho 
Code§ 50-219 and the Idaho Tort Claims Act, notice must be (1) in 
writing; (2) filed with the city clerk; (3) submitted within 180 days from 
the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered; and 
(4) contain statutorily-specified information regarding the plaintiffs 
residence and the facts and circumstances surrounding the plaintiffs 
injuries. See also Idaho Code § 6-907. Yet, Brown's demand letters do not 
meet the applicable notice requirements because the letters do not include 
the statutorily-specified information, such as Brown's address, the amount 
of his alleged damages, or the nature of his damages. More importantly, 
neither of the letters were addressed to or formally filed with Caldwell's 
City clerk. Service of the demand letters therefore did not satisfy the 
notice of claim requirement. 
r 
Id. at 1263. In the case at hand, there is evidence that a letter was submitted in writing to 
the mayor, and a letter was submitted to a councilman, within 180 days from the date the 
claim arose. See Affidavit of Mercedes Turner, Exhibit C and D. However, these letters 
were not filed with the city clerk, nor did they contain statutorily-specified information 
regarding the plaintiffs residence and the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. 
The Plaintiff relies on Smith v. City of Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 586 P .2d 1062 
(1978) and Hujfv. Uhl, 103 Idaho 274, 647 P.2d 730 (1982) in support of her argument 
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that she substantially complied with the ITCA notice requirements. In Smith, an injured 
motorist's insurance carrier wrote a letter to the City which served as notice of a claim 
against the city. The Smith Court determined the letter was sufficient to notify the city 
that a claim was being pursued and apprised the city of sufficient facts for it to investigate 
the matter, determine the merits and prepare a defense. 
Although the contents of the letter of October 8 does not comply with 
all the requirements enumerated in § 6-907, we believe the contents of the 
letter were adequate in light of the final proviso of that section which 
states that "(a) claim ... shall not be held invalid or insufficient by reason 
of an inaccuracy in stating the time, place, nature or cause of the claim, or 
otherwise, unless it is shown that the governmental entity was in fact 
misled to its injury thereby." LC. § 6-907. At the time summary judgment 
was entered, there was nothing in the record to suggest that the city was 
"misled to its injury" by any deficiencies in the contents of the letter. On 
the contrary, the reply by the city's insurance carrier indicates that the 
October 8 letter was sufficient to notify the city that a claim against it was 
being pursued and to apprise the city of sufficient facts for it to investigate 
the matter, determine its merits and prepare a defense. See Newlan v. 
State, supra. 
Because the letter of October 8 adequately informed the city of a claim 
against it, the notice issue raised here is very different from that raised in 
Newlan and Callister. Those cases involved situations in which the 
governmental entity had learned, through its own investigation or 
otherwise, of the occurrence of the accident and injury during the 120 day 
period; the governmental entity had "substantial actual notice" of the 
injury. However, in those cases the governmental entity had not been 
presented with formal notice that the injured party intended to pursue a 
claim against it. In Newlan and Callister we ruled that compliance with the 
notice requirements of the Tort Claims Act was a condition precedent to 
bringing a suit against a governmental entity and that the government's 
actual notice of the injury did not obviate the need to satisfy those notice 
requirements. Mere knowledge of the injury does not necessarily put the r 
governmental entity on notice that a claim against it is being prosecuted 
and thus apprise it of the need to preserve evidence and perhaps prepare a 
defense. In contrast to those cases, the letter in this case certainly put the 
city on notice that a claim against it was being pursued. Thus, the city not 
only knew of Smith's accident but knew also that a claim against it based 
on that accident would be prosecuted. This case does not involve the 
situation where the governmental entity had "actual notice of the injury" 
but no notice of the claim. Here the city had notice of both the accident 
and the claim. 
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Smith v. City of Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 621-622, 586 P.2d 1062, 1065 - 1066 (1978). 
The case at hand is distinguishable from Smith. In this case, Turner contends the 
three documents she presented to the City were sufficient to put the City on notice she 
was filing a tort claim against them. The information in these documents is sufficient for;-
purposes of creating substantial actual notice to the City that Turner was seeking 
compensation for mileage reimbursement, vacation and comp-time pay. However, the 
letters are deficient for purposes of notice because nothing within the documents informs 
the City of the specific amounts ofreimbursement, vacation and comp-time pay that 
Turner was seeking. Nor do the letters inform the City that Turner was planning to file 
suit against the City if she did not receive compensation for those requested items. 
The case at hand is akin to the facts in Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 711, 535 P.2d 
1348 (1975). In Newlan, a wrongful death suit was filed against the governmental entity. 
The Plaintiffs argued that the State had notice of the claims because the accidents 
involved were investigated and reports were filed. Nonetheless, the Newlan Court upheld 
the district court's order granting summary judgment. 
Although the accidents involved herein were apparently investigated and 
reports thereof were filed, nevertheless there is no indication that the State 
could have even suspected it might be subject to a claim. The State was 
not on notice of any facts to allow it to arrive at an amicable accord with a 
claimant or to investigate a possible claim to determine its merits and if 
necessary prepare a defense, which are two of the purposes for a notice 
statute set forth in Jorstad. 
Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 711, 716-717, 535 P.2d 1348, 1353 - 1354 (1975). 
As stated above, knowledge of the alleged injury does not necessarily put the 
governmental entity on notice that a claim against it is being prosecuted. In the case 
before this Court, Turner did inform the City she would like certain reimbursements and 
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back pay. However, at no time did Turner specify the amounts she was seeking for these 
requests. Nor did Turner ever indicate to the City that she would pursue a claim in court 
in the event the City did not comply with her requests. There is nothing in this record 
which indicates the City had an opportunity to arrive at an amicable accord with the 
Plaintiff in the time frame set forth by the ITCA. 
Turner failed to substantially comply with the notice requirements set forth in the 
ITCA. Therefore, the City's motion for summary judgment is granted. 
CONCLUSION 
The City seeks summary dismissal of the claims set forth because the Plaintiff 
failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, and because 
the wage claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The Plaintiff contends 
that a paycheck request, a letter to the mayor, and a letter to a city councilor were 
sufficient to place the City on notice of her claims. However, documents the Plaintiff 
relies upon do not set forth specific amounts the Plaintiff was seeking, nor do they 
adequately put the City on notice that Turner would file suit if the payments were not 
made. Thus, these documents do not substantially comply with the notice requirement as 
set forth in LC.§§ 6-906, 6907, and 6908. Based upon the foregoing analysis, the 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. 
MEMORANDUM OPTh1ION A.ND ORDER 
ON DEFE'NTIANT'S MOTION FOR 
9 /)5 
---------<-:-:-~-:---: 
ORDER 
The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
/t..., 
Dated this '-2_ 0 1 day of September 2013. 
CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge 
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ISB No. 3737 
ISB No. 9180 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Lapwai 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
MERCEDES TURNER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF LAPWAI, an Idaho municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-2587 
JUDGMENT 
Based on the Court's September 20, 2013, Memorandum, Opinion and Order 
on defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Judgment is hereby entered in favor of 
defendant and against plaintiff. 
nmG-MENT 
DATED this ~_;f/ay of September, 2013. 
CARL B. KERRICK 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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John M. Howell, ISB No. 6234 
Matthew G. Gunn, ISB No. 8763 
BRASSEY, CRAWFORD & HOWELL, PLLC 
203 W. Main Street 
P.O. Box 1009 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009 
Telephone: (208) 344-7300 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
MERCEDES TUM'ER, 
Case No. CV 12-02587 
Plaintif£' Appellant, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
vs. 
CITY OF LAPWAI; and DOES 1-10, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, THEIR ATTORNEY, AND THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GNEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellant appeals against the above named respondents to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from the final Judgment entered on September 23, 2013, and the Memorandum 
Opinion and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment entered September 20, 2013, in 
the above entitled action, the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick presiding. 
2. Appellant has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Judgment 
and Memorandum Opinion and Order described in Paragraph 1, supra, pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
Rule l l(a)(l). 
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3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal: 
a The District Court erred in granting Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment. Specifically, the notice of tort claim provided by appellant to the City of Lapwai was 
sufficient to satisfy the notice requirements ofidaho Code §§ 50-219 and 6-907. 
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5. a. A reporter's transcript has been requested. 
b. The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the 
reporter's transcript in []hard copy []electronic format [x] both: The reporter's standard transcript 
as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 25(c). 
6. The appellant requests a Clerk's Record of those documents automatically included 
under Idaho Appellate Rule 28. Additionally, the appellant requests that the following documents 
be included as part of the Clerk's Record: 
a Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (July 3, 2013) 
b. Defendant's Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment (July 
3, 2013) 
c. Affidavit of William D. Big Man (with exhibits/attachments) (July 3, 2013) 
d. Affidavit of Counsel (with exhibits/attachments) (July 3, 2013) 
e. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (July 23, 2013) 
f. Affidavit of Mercedes Turner (with exhibits/attachments) (July 23, 2013) 
g. Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Summary Judgment (July 30, 
2013) 
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h. Supplemental Declaration of Counsel (vvith exhibits/attachments) (July 30, 
2013) 
I. Memorandum Opinion and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (September 20, 2013) 
7. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter of whom 
a transcript has been requested as named below, at the address set out below: 
Linda Carlton 
425 Warner Ave. 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
b. That the clerk of the district court will be paid as soon as the clerk advises 
what the amount of the fee will be for preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record will be paid as 
soon as the clerk advises what the amount will be. 
d. That the appellate filing fees, if any, have been paid. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
DATED this 281h day of October, 2013. 
BRASSEY, CRAWFORD & HOWELL, PLLC 
l3~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this28thdayof0ctober, 2013, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL, upon each of the following individuals by causing the 
same to be delivered by the method and to the addresses indicated below: 
Bentley G. Stromberg 
Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Linda Carlton 
Court Reporter 
425 Warner Ave. 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile (208) 746-0753 
'< U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
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John M. Howell, ISB No. 6234 
Matthew G. Gunn, ISB No. 8763 -
BRASSEY, CRAWFORD & HO\VELL, PLLC F I LE D 
203 w. Mmn stieet - -
P.O. Box 1009 _ -.. , __ 
Boise, Idaho 8 3 7 0 h1QQ9; - mu N(J.J 16 fiffJ 11 09 
Telephone: (208) 344-7300 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077 
Attorneys for Plaintiff! Appellant 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AL~ FOR THE COUNTY 
MERCEDES TURNER, 
Case No. CV 12~02587 
· Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
Af\1ENDED NOTICE OF 
vs. 
CITY OF LAPWAI; andDOES 1-10, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, THElR ATTOR 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COTJRT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellant appeals againstthe abovenarned rr.:spc•ndcHls to t't<: 
Supreme Court from the final Judgment entered on September 23, 2013, and the.; f;·k 111r·ra <UY 
Opinion and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment cnt1..,~etJ Septc:n1b,,;r 2C. l J, i • j 
~ 'i ; ::: ·..:_ " •• 
' .. , • ·1. ';. . 
the above entitled action, the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick presiding. 
2. Appellant has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court from tk linnl J:. h, 
and Memorandum Opinion and Order described in Paragraph 1, supra, ptu;:;um1.t to Idr.1.bo 
Rule ll(a)(l). 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
Nov 18 2013 11: 42AM BRAS SEY CRFIWFORD Ai-W ttr'llf nuw 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal: 
a. The District Court erred in granting Defendants' n;.vtion °v :';r''' 
judgment. SpecificaUy, the notice of tort claim provided by appeJlont to 1 he City ,,:·; 
suffi.cientto satisfy the nptic,e requirements of Idaho Code §§ 50-219 aud 
~-" .,;c • _. ', • '. •• 
4. No order hasb~en entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5. a. A reporter's transcript has been requested. 
b. The Appellant requests the prepa.rntion of foe faHowintr: i(;.' ·- ') ! 
reporter's transcript in []hard copy []electronic fonnat [x] both: Transcript cf '. 11 
Hearing ofAugust 6, 2013. Court Reporter: Linda Carlton. Transcript cstima:c,; tu r~ ,.,,. :11 ,., 1 
pages. 
6, Theappellant requests a Clerk's Record of those documents at•tc~urnti• 
~ . ' 
' . .~ ; : - '.: 
under Idaho Appell~te Rul~28. Additionally, the appellant requests that tli'.: foliowing ,:\:< 
; ·. , •' ~·-~,.·~;·i" "< 2·/; ' - i ·.:.1 
be included as Part ~f the qi?"k.'~ Repord: 
a. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (July 3, '.W1 
b. Defendant'sMemoranduminSupportofMotion forS1.mu.n:.iry J 
3, 2013) 
c. Affidavit of William D. Big Man (with cxhibits/nHud:m 
d. Affidavit of Counsel (with exhibits/attach1ncnt:1) (-1Dly 3, 2f, 1 '· 
e. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendm1 t" ~> 
. .,;::: .,· 
Judgment (lu}y.:23, 2013) · 
, : r f.. (,:;}, i:Alfid.av!trci(i>;1ercedes Turner (with e;v.hihits/attadurn;:nL·;) 0 
·•·: .. ,-., .. i .. .: 
g. Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Sm11m2try .T Ddgwcnt (.)' 
2013) 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 135 
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h. Supplemental Declaration of Counsel (with exhibits/allnd'liJcu':C; (1,,:;· ... · 
2013)' 
.. ~ i. ·. 
Judgment (Sept~fuber20, 'io13) 
7. I certify: 
a. That acopyofthisNoticeof Appeal has been served.on th·::: n 
a transcript bas been requested as named below, at the address set out below; 
been paid: . 
b. 
Linda Carlton 
425 Warner Ave. 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
The estimated fee of $ 7 5. 00 for preparation of tl1'.') r cportc.r' s lrn 
' t ·.,:;~ .' ._·,.~ ~~ ~·~,~,~}·~-:·~ ~' 
c;·'.. ·· · TheJeeof$100.00 for preparation of tbc clerk's record lws b1::.; 
... ; ·' - ' •· 
d. That the appellate filing fees, if any, have been p;1id. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties n~qui.rcd to be ~u,···: 1 •11·-:· • 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
DATED this 18th day of November, 2013·. 
BRASSEY, CRA VVFOlU) & 1-JO\VELL, !' 
By /1~ /!~---:_~----·--···· fa~olin M. Howell, Of the Firrn 
~... Attorneys for Plaintiff 
' '.· ~··· ' 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
f 8~ 
Nov 18 2013 11:42.AM BRASSEY CRAWFORD AND HOW . 7U7? 
''; ,- .. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERYilCE. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18111 dayofNovember, 2013, I ~:crvcd;: 1r:H: ·::H.: '·''' 
copy of the foregoing AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL, upon each ofthc follos:;'~i <i; !1 ::•: :: 
by causing the same to be delivered by the method and to the addresses indic;:r~ed b::L:nv: 
Bentley G. Stromberg 
Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewistov, Idaho ~~501. 
' ;_ • ~ , .; < , • < ' 
Linda Carlton . · 
co1iit Reporter 
425 .Wam~?(,A,y~/ ._ ., 
Lewiston, Idalio.$3~01'>;;. 
.· . ' : .. ·: _:. ".' ·. 
I U.S. Mail, puslnge p;~·,::-ai<l 
Hand-Ddivcrcd 
Overnight Milil 
FacsimjJc (208) 7<16-07 ')~'· 
_L 1J.S. Mail, pustagc 
Hand-DchYercd 
Overnight ]\fail 
Facsimile 
(V] ___ 
fuie:._ John M. Howell 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MERCEDES ELINA TURNER 1 
Plaintiff-Appellant 1 
v. 
CITY OF LAPWAI 1 
Defendant-Respondent 1 
and 
Does 1-10 1 
Defendants. 
Case No. SC #41560 
CLERK 1 S CERTIFICATE 
I 1 Patty 0. Weeks 1 Clerk of the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Nez Perce, do hereby certify that the foregoing Clerk's Record in 
the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound by me and 
contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, documents, and 
papers designated to be included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate 
Rules, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross-Appeal, and 
additional documents that were requested. 
I further certify: 
1. That no exhibits were marked for identification or 
admitted into evidence during the course of this action. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of said court this /(} day of December 2013. 
PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk 
By 
Deputy Clerk 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
f 3~ 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MERCEDES ELINA TURNER 1 
Plaintiff-Appellant/ 
v. 
CITY OF LAPWAI, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
and 
Does 1-10, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. SC #41560 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk of the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Nez Perce, do hereby certify that copies of the Clerk's Record 
and Reporter's Transcript were placed in the United States mail 
and addressed to John M. Howell, 203 W Main St, P 0 Box 1009, 
Boise, ID 83701 and hand delivered to Bentley G. Stromberg, 321 
13th St, P 0 Box 1510, Lewiston, ID 83501, this ~~day of 
Decerr~er 2013. 
1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of the said Court this day of December 2013. 
PATTY 0. WEEKS 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
Deputy Clerk 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
